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INITIATING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: THE
INCREASED IMPORTANCE UNDER AEDPA OF SEEKING
CERTIORARI FROM JUDGMENTS OF STATE COURTS

GIOVANNA SHAY* & CHRISTOPHER LASCH**

ABSTRACT
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
contains a provision restricting federal courts from considering any
authority other than holdings of the Supreme Court in determining
whether to grant a state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus.
Through an empirical study of cert filings and cases decided by the
Supreme Court, we assess this provision’s impact on the development
of federal constitutional criminal doctrine. Before AEDPA and other
restrictions on federal habeas corpus, lower federal courts and state
courts contributed to doctrinal development by engaging in a
“dialogue” (as described by Robert M. Cover and T. Alexander
Aleinikoff in a 1977 article). This dialogue served to articulate the
broad constitutional principles set forth in Supreme Court precedent.
AEDPA has effectively ended the conversation, because under
AEDPA federal courts lack the power to resolve emerging constitu
tional issues in the context of state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions.
Now that only Supreme Court precedent can provide the basis for
federal habeas relief under AEDPA, it is more important for open
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questions to be presented to the Supreme Court. Unless cert is sought
and granted in cases arising out of state criminal proceedings,
constitutional criminal doctrine may be frozen. Current certiorari
practice is out of step with this reality. Our analysis of the procedural
posture of criminal cases in which certiorari was granted by the
Supreme Court over the past twelve years demonstrates that, since
1995, the Supreme Court’s certiorari grants in criminal cases have
been tilting away from federal prisoners’ direct appeals and towards
state prisoners’ federal habeas and (to a lesser degree) state court
direct appeals. Because the Court is not, as a general matter, using
certiorari grants in state prisoners’ federal habeas cases to develop
doctrine, it appears that certiorari from state court direct appeals is
poised to become the primary vehicle for such development. Yet an
empirical analysis of certiorari petitions filed in the October 2006
Supreme Court term reveals a gap between this opportunity for
doctrinal development and practitioners’ current certiorari-seeking
behavior. We coded 347 “paid” certiorari petitions and a sample of
300 in forma pauperis petitions, categorizing cases by procedural
posture. Although certiorari grants in federal prisoners’ direct
appeals are declining dramatically, the leading category of cert
filings remains federal prisoners’ direct appeals. Given that there are
far more state criminal proceedings each year than federal prosecu
tions, we argue these trends demonstrate an opportunity to file more
and better certiorari petitions from state criminal proceedings. We
urge the criminal defense community to close this “cert gap,” both to
ensure a better standard of review for individual clients and to
promote continued development of the law.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its passage in 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA)1 has attracted considerable attention for its
impact on the availability of federal habeas corpus remedies for
state prisoners. Legal scholars have written about AEDPA’s impact
on separation of powers,2 federalism,3 and the effectiveness of the
Great Writ.4 Empirical work also has documented AEDPA’s effects
on habeas litigation in the federal courts.5
We set out to understand the provision of AEDPA that prohibits
federal habeas courts reviewing state court judgments from
considering decisions other than those of the United States Supreme
Court in determining whether the state court judgment adequately
comports with federal law:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person
in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be
granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the
claim ... resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
1. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 28 U.S.C.).
2. See Joseph M. Brunner, Negating Precedent and (Selectively) Suspending Stare
Decisis: AEDPA and Problems for the Article III Hierarchy, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 307 (2006);
James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and Quality of
Decisionmaking Required of Article III Court, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 696 (1998).
3. See Frederic M. Bloom, State Courts Unbound, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (2008); Justin
F. Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), 82 TUL.
L. REV. 385 (2007); Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 TUL.
L. REV. 443 (2007); Allan Ides, Habeas Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1):
A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme Court Precedent, 60 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 677
(2003); Adam N. Steinman, Reconceptualizing Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
How Should AEDPA’s Standard of Review Operate After Williams v. Taylor, 2001 WIS. L. REV.
1493 (2001); Lee B. Kovarsky, AEDPA’s (Imaginary) Purposes (2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/lee_kovarsky/5).
4. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreward to RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at v, ix-xii (5th ed. 2005); Padraic Foran, Note,
Unreasonably Wrong: The Supreme Court’s Supremacy, the AEDPA Standard, and Carey v.
Musladin, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 571, 598-607 (2008) (discussing constitutional problems with
AEDPA ranging from “habeas-specific” to separation of powers and federalism).
5. See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II & BRIAN J. OSTROM, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS 1-3 (2007).
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an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.6

This provision not only increases the importance of Supreme
Court precedent—and limits the value of lower federal court
decisions—but also greatly heightens the significance of the
procedural vehicle in which questions are presented to the Court.
Because AEDPA limits the Court’s ability to “break [] new ground”
in cases arising from federal habeas petitions,7 cutting edge
questions must be presented in petitions for a writ of certiorari from
the judgments of state courts if federal constitutional law is to
continue to develop in state criminal proceedings. Last term, four
justices of the Supreme Court recognized this new reality in their
dissent in Lawrence v. Florida.8 They wrote that the pre-AEDPA
sentiment that “federal habeas proceedings were generally the more
appropriate avenue for our consideration of federal constitutional
claims” was no longer true in light of AEDPA’s “as determined by
the Supreme Court” provision.9 “Since AEDPA,” they explained, “our
consideration of state habeas petitions has become more pressing.”10
We wanted to examine how this provision might affect the
development of criminal constitutional law when superimposed on
6. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added); see also David R. Row & Eric M.
Freedman, The Effects of AEDPA on Justice, in CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE NEXT GENERATION
OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH (North Carolina Academic Press, forthcoming 2008) (finding that
success rate in capital habeas cases has fallen to approximately one-fifth of pre-AEDPA
success rate). It is also possible under AEDPA to obtain habeas relief if the judgment was
“based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” § 2254(d)(2). We do not concern ourselves with § 2254(d)(2) in this
Article, but note in passing that permitting lower federal courts to correct “unreasonable”
factual determinations of the state courts does not permit those federal courts to engage in
doctrinal development, and thus does not mitigate AEDPA’s effect on doctrinal development,
a central issue of our concern. We recognize the possibility, however, that there may be a
subset of cases in which habeas relief is sought under § 2254(d)(2) but not under § 2254(d)(1),
to which our analysis is inapplicable. Similarly, we recognize our conclusions may not apply
to what we suspect is another narrow class of cases—those in which a habeas petitioner may
avoid the operation of § 2254(d) altogether, because the federal claim was not “adjudicated on
the merits in State court proceedings.” § 2254(d).
7. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000) (quotation omitted) (Stevens, J., in
a portion of the decision joined by only three other justices) (discussing AEDPA’s “as
determined by the Supreme Court” provision).
8. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1089 n.7.
10. Id.
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actual certiorari practice. To that end, we reviewed criminal cases
decided by the Supreme Court over the last dozen terms, as well as
certiorari petitions filed during the October 2006 term. We found
that the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior has changed over the
past twelve terms. Certiorari from federal prisoners’ direct appeal
proceedings, once the dominant vehicle for criminal cases decided
by the Court, has dropped to a third-place position behind state
prisoners’ federal habeas cases and state prisoners’ direct appeals.
We found practitioners’ certiorari-seeking behavior to be out of step
with this development—despite the relative decline in certiorari
grants in federal prisoners’ direct appeals, such cases remained the
largest category of certiorari filings in the October 2006 term.
Petitions from state prisoners’ direct appeals appear to be grossly
underrepresented, considering that state prosecutions far outpace
federal prosecutions. Petitions from state prisoners’ state postconviction proceedings are a relatively small category of filings;11 as
Justice Stevens has recognized, they are rarely granted.12 Based on
our survey, we argue that defender and pro bono resources should
be increased (and in some situations refocused) to improve the
number and quality of cert petitions filed from state criminal
proceedings (both direct appeal and postconviction).
This Article takes both doctrinal and empirical approaches. In
Part I, we provide a doctrinal framework for understanding the
historical importance of AEDPA’s “as determined by the Supreme
Court” provision. In Part II, we discuss the interpretation of the
11. There is good reason to believe that state postconviction proceedings will be an
increasingly important arena for the development of constitutional doctrine in criminal cases.
In its recent decision in Danforth v. Minnesota, 128 S. Ct. 1029 (2008), the Supreme Court
held state courts are not bound by federal rules regarding the non-retroactivity of new
constitutional rules which have inhibited doctrinal development in federal courts. See infra
notes 46-51 and accompanying text (discussing Teague’s non-retroactivity doctrine). Given the
narrowing field of opportunities for doctrinal development, this is a significant development.
A rise in cert grants from state postconviction judgments in recent years, see infra charts
accompanying notes 147-48, may yet prove to be statistically significant, if such cases
provided a needed opportunity for doctrinal development. Furthermore, if (as we expect), the
Court’s federal habeas docket begins to decline, state postconviction cert petitions will
increase in importance. See infra Part IV.
12. 127 S. Ct. at 1084 (“As Justice Stevens has noted, ‘this Court rarely grants review at
this stage of the litigation even when the application for state collateral relief is supported by
arguably meritorious federal constitutional claims,’ choosing instead to wait for ‘federal
habeas proceedings.’” (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
concurring))).
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provision and its impact on the development of criminal constitu
tional law. Part II.A examines Supreme Court opinions involving 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) to explain how the standard has been inter
preted and to demonstrate the remarkable break with the past
embodied in this provision. Part II.B offers brief case studies of this
provision’s impact on the development of constitutional doctrine.
Part III offers an empirical attempt to place AEDPA’s “as deter
mined by the Supreme Court” provision in context. We begin in Part
III.A with an overview of the procedural postures of criminal cases
decided by the Court from October Term 1995 to October Term
2006. We continue in Part III.B with a survey of petitions for
certiorari filed in October Term 2006 to see how practitioners are
behaving in this new post-AEDPA climate. In Part IV, we consider
possible explanations for the depressed cert-seeking rate for state
prisoners in state court direct appeals and postconviction proceed
ings, and discuss results of a survey of certiorari-seeking practice.
We conclude by offering some recommendations to close the gap and
ensure the continued development of criminal constitutional law.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
AEDPA’S “[A]S DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT”
PROVISION—THE RISE AND DECLINE OF “DIALECTICAL
FEDERALISM”
In 1977, Yale Professor Robert M. Cover and then-student T.
Alexander Aleinikoff asserted that the Warren Court had instituted
an “expanded federal writ of habeas corpus”13 as the enforcement
mechanism for its “reforms in criminal procedure.”14 While remedial
plans for injunctive relief had been instituted in the desegregation
and voting rights contexts, the Warren Court revolution in con
stitutional criminal procedure was enforced only indirectly, by an
invigorated federal habeas.15 The Warren Court’s habeas doctrine,
most notably Fay v. Noia,16 was intended to safeguard the opportu
nity for “federal adjudications free from the impact of structural
13. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus
and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041 (1977); see Steinman, supra note 3, at 1521-23.
14. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036.
15. Id. at 1039-42.
16. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
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deficiencies in state criminal processes.”17 Cover and Aleinikoff
described the structure of federal habeas under Fay as a “strategy
of redundancy,”18 by which they meant that the state and federal
court systems “serve[d] as a check on one another.”19 For this
strategy to work, they wrote, the two systems had to function
“independent[ly,] in the sense that malfunction of one [would] not
affect the functioning of the other.”20
Fay constructed this “strategy of redundancy” by holding that
“state court adjudications [of constitutional criminal procedure
issues] could not estop federal court adjudication,”21 and by permit
ting federal habeas review of state criminal convictions unless a
defendant had “‘deliberately bypassed’ state procedures.”22 Federal
courts were “in an initially strong position” under the Fay regime,
wrote Cover and Aleinikoff, because “no conviction can stand unless
both tribunals concur, provided that the federal forum is invoked.”23
However, they explained, “state courts ... are not helpless before
federal power.”24 “While the state court pays a price in released
prisoners, it can exact a price from the federal court by frustrating
that court’s objectives in the majority of cases which will never
eventuate in a petition for federal habeas corpus.”25 Cover and
Aleinikoff wrote that this dynamic created “incentives for each court
system to acknowledge and, if possible, satisfy some of the more
reasonable demands of the other.”26
In their article, Cover and Aleinikoff explained that this “strategy
of redundancy” not only implemented new constitutional criminal
procedure reforms, but also “had a significant impact on the creation
and reliability of protection of constitutional rights.”27 “Fay permit
ted and encouraged a dialogue between state and federal courts that
helped define and evolve constitutional rights,” they wrote.28 In this
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1042.
Id. at 1044.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1044 (quoting Fay, 372 U.S. at 438).
Id. at 1052.
Id.
Id. at 1053.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id.
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dialogue, “state and federal courts were required both to speak and
listen as equals.”29 The “dialogue” between state and federal courts
had a “profound impact on the development of constitutional law”
in “the absence of controlling Supreme Court rules.”30
Under this “dialectical federalism” described by Cover and
Aleinikoff, the Supreme Court might “define the values from which
a dialogue will proceed,”31 but it would be the “ensuing dialogue”
between lower federal courts and state courts that would have the
“profound impact on the development of constitutional law.”32
Examining the development of the doctrine of effective assistance of
counsel, Cover and Aleinikoff described how, by virtue of this
dialogue, “a significant shift in doctrine has occurred in the federal
and state courts with no more than dicta from the Supreme Court
to guide it.”33
The world of state-federal court “dialogue” in the area of consti
tutional criminal doctrine was already being cut back as Cover
and Aleinikoff wrote in 1977.34 Cover and Aleinikoff wrote about
different attitudes of the Supreme Court towards habeas, and ways
in which federal habeas corpus was being restricted in the seven
ties. For example, they discussed the Court’s 1978 decision in Stone
v. Powell,35 virtually eliminating federal habeas relief for state
prisoners’ Fourth Amendment claims.36 In an “epilogue” to their
article, they acknowledged that after they completed their piece the
Court had decided Wainwright v. Sykes,37 replacing the deliberate
bypass rule of Fay with a procedural default rule.38 Now the CoverAleinikoff “dialogue” was limited to claims that had been presented

29. Id. at 1036.
30. Id. at 1065.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Steinman, supra note 3, at 1496-97 (discussing how the Supreme Court’s decision
in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), sanctioning de novo review of federal constitutional
claims in state prisoners’ federal habeas cases, had occasioned criticism, most notably by
Professor Paul M. Bator in his seminal article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas
Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 447 (1963)).
35. 428 U.S. 465 (1976)
36. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1076-78, 1086-88.
37. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
38. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1100.
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first to state courts in accordance with state procedural rules, unless
a defendant could establish “cause and prejudice” for the default.39
In the ensuing twenty years, federal courts continued to restrict
federal habeas as “legal conservatives became uncomfortable with
what they saw as expansive judicial intervention in the criminal
justice process.”40 During this period, the Supreme Court issued
decisions invigorating the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural
default,41 restricting the filing of “second or subsequent” habeas
petitions,42 limiting the circumstances in which federal courts could
grant evidentiary hearings,43 expanding deference to state courts’
factual findings,44 and imposing a harmless error standard in
federal habeas.45
Most significant here, in Teague v. Lane,46 the Court established
a non-retroactivity doctrine, drastically restricting the application
of “new” rules of constitutional criminal procedure in habeas
39. Id. (quotation omitted). As Professor Larry Yackle has explained, the transition from
Fay’s “deliberate-bypass” standard to Wainwright’s “procedural default” standard constituted
a seismic shift in federal courts’ role reviewing state court criminal judgments. LARRY W.
YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 192-99 (2003). Now state procedural rules had
preclusive effect and federal courts could not look beyond a prisoner’s default to consider the
merits of a constitutional claim. Id. at 192-94. Fay’s “deliberate-bypass” rule required a
“‘considered choice of the petitioner,’” id. at 197 (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439
(1963)), and thus “permitted prisoners to seek federal relief on the basis of claims that state
courts found to be barred because of procedural default ascribable to defense counsel’s
ignorance or neglect.” Id. Procedural default doctrine after Sykes was much less forgiving.
While Fay’s “deliberate-bypass” standard “did not foreclose federal habeas corpus[] except in
cases in which there was good reason for penalizing a failure to comply with state procedural
rules,” Yackle writes, procedural default after Sykes barred federal habeas review “except in
cases in which there is good reason for excusing a failure to comply with state procedural
rules.” Id. at 199.
40. Mark Tushnet & Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47
DUKE L.J. 1, 4-5 (1997).
41. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The “Hype” and the “Bite,” 91 CORNELL L. REV. 259, 266
68 (2006). Professor Blume summarizes the doctrinal developments preceding AEDPA,
including, inter alia, Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (abandoning Fay’s doctrine of
“deliberate bypass” in favor of rule that prisoner must demonstrate “cause and prejudice” to
excuse procedural default); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510, 522 (1982) (establishing “total
exhaustion” rule requiring courts to dismiss “mixed” petitions containing both exhausted and
unexhausted claims); and Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995).
42. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
43. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
44. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981).
45. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993).
46. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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proceedings.47 Under Teague, unless a prisoner fits within certain
narrow exceptions, he or she:
[M]ay not seek to enforce a “new rule” of law in federal habeas
corpus proceedings if the new rule was announced after the
petitioner’s conviction became “final” or if the petitioner is
seeking to establish a wholly new rule or to apply a settled
precedent in a novel way that would result in the creation of a
new rule.48

The Teague rule “has profoundly changed the law of habeas
corpus and narrowed the range of relief that is available in habeas
corpus proceedings.”49 As we discuss below,50 Congress codified and
expanded Teague in the “as determined by the Supreme Court”
provision of AEDPA.51 We now turn to that radical restriction on
habeas relief.
II. AEDPA’S “AS DETERMINED BY THE SUPREME COURT”
PROVISION—THE END OF “DIALECTICAL FEDERALISM” AND ITS
IMPACT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The constriction of federal habeas reached a new extreme in
AEDPA.52 AEDPA restricts federal habeas relief for state prisoners
in a number of ways. The provision with which we are con
cerned—and which we claim has a significant impact on the
development of federal constitutional law—bars federal district
courts from granting a state prisoner’s habeas petition unless the
state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.”53

47. Id. at 316.
48. RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 1138 (5th ed. 2005) (citations omitted).
49. Id. at 1137-38.
50. See infra Part II.A.
51. See also HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 48, at 1137-38.
52. Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 40, at 4-12 (explaining the slow restriction of habeas
relief under Supreme Court jurisprudence that culminated with Congress’ passage of
AEDPA).
53. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
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Upon signing AEDPA into law, President Clinton specifically
commented on the “as determined by the Supreme Court”
provision.54 “Some have suggested,” President Clinton wrote, “that
this provision will limit the authority of the Federal courts to bring
their own independent judgment to bear” in habeas cases.55 Citing
no less an authority than Marbury v. Madison,56 President Clinton
wrote that he expected the courts to construe AEDPA to avoid the
constitutional problems that would accompany a law purporting to
“preclude the Federal courts from making an independent determi
nation about ‘what the law is.’”57 Thus, President Clinton implied
that the “as determined by the Supreme Court” provision of AEDPA
would be harmonized with prior habeas practice, and would work no
significant change on federal habeas corpus.
A. AEDPA and the End of “Dialectical Federalism”
President Clinton’s signing statement has been dismissed as
nothing more than “lip service to meaningful federal court review of
state court convictions.”58 Nonetheless, the constitutional argument
(the substantive merits of which are beyond the scope of this Article)

54. Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 1
PUB. PAPERS 630 (Apr. 24, 1996) [hereinafter Signing Statement].
55. Id. at 631.
56. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
57. Signing Statement, supra note 54, at 631.
58. Blume, supra note 41, at 259. Professor Blume, like Professors Tushnet and Yackle,
advances the argument that AEDPA did not enact sweeping changes, as the Supreme Court
“had already significantly curtailed the writ of habeas corpus” through judicial decisions. Id.
at 262. Cf. Ides, supra note 3, at 684 (“This focus on Supreme Court precedent can be seen as
a major revision of the law of habeas. It effectively reins in circuit courts that may have a
proclivity to expand the rights of habeas petitioners and leaves the development of the law
in this context solely in the hands of the Supreme Court. Experimentation by the lower courts
is, in essence, forbidden.”); Brief for Marvin E. Frankel et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 25, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (No. 98-8384) (“The ‘clearly
established by Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court’ clause of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) works a substantial change from previous law ....”).
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has been advanced in litigation59 and by commentators,60 and
remains to be confronted directly by the Supreme Court.61 The Court
has construed the “as determined by the Supreme Court” provision
of AEDPA—but not in a manner that suggests receptiveness to the
constitutional concerns to which President Clinton alluded.62
In Williams v. Taylor, all members of the Court agreed that
“clearly established Federal law” under AEDPA includes only
decisions of the Supreme Court.63 In this respect, all concurred,
AEDPA goes further than prior Supreme Court non-retroactivity
precedent in Teague.64 Under this interpretation, AEDPA is more
59. See Crater v. Galaza, 508 F.3d 1261, 1261-62 (9th Cir. 2007) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc); Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2007)
(Noonan, J., concurring); Foley v. Parker, 481 F.3d 380, 399 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Davis v. Straub, 430 F.3d 281, 296-98 (6th Cir.
2005) (Merritt, J., dissenting); Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 869-70 (7th Cir. 1996), rev’d on
other grounds, 521 U.S. 320 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Liebman & Ryan, supra note 2, at 868-84 (arguing that interpretations of §
2254(d)(1) by the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits were unconstitutional).
61. Although the Court has declined to grant certiorari to decide the constitutionality of
the “clearly established federal law” clause, see, e.g., Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865, 874-75
(4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 (1999) (rejecting Article III challenge to
§ 2254(d)(1)), the most that can be said is that the Court “probably” deems the clause to be
constitutional. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 671 (9th Cir. 2007) (Fernandez, J., concurring).
Indeed, many questions about AEDPA’s provisions remain unresolved over a decade after its
passage. See Marceau, supra note 3, at 387 (“[A]lthough AEDPA is now over a decade old,
courts, commentators, and practitioners all continue to struggle to make sense of the Act’s key
provisions dealing with questions of fact in federal habeas proceedings.”).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
63. 529 U.S. 362, 381 (2000). Compare id., with id. at 412-13 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
part). Amici Marvin E. Frankel, James K. Logan, Lawrence W. Pierce, George C. Pratt, and
Harold R. Tyler (retired Article III judges) urged the Court to refrain from interpreting the
“as determined by the Supreme Court” clause of § 2254(d)(1) to avoid constitutional questions
not squarely presented. Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 58, at 25. The Court did not
refrain from interpreting the clause, but neither did the Court explicitly address its
constitutionality.
64. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (“Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule,
new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to those cases which have
become final before the new rules are announced.”). Prior to AEDPA’s enactment, some
commentators warned that Teague itself would “largely eliminate[] habeas corpus as a
mechanism for the development of federal law.” YACKLE, supra note 39, at 87; see also James
S. Liebman, More Than “Slightly Retro:” The Rehnquist Court’s Rout of Habeas Corpus
Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 575 (1990-1991)
(criticizing the Teague plurality’s suggestion that retroactivity question should be resolved
before the merits on the grounds that “the plurality approach would forbid lower federal
judges from interpreting the United States Constitution in habeas corpus cases and would
relegate those judges to the nearly ministerial task of putting into operation decisions that
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than a mere codification of judge-made rules (as some have
argued)65—it is a radical extension of Supreme Court habeas
doctrine.66 There appears to be little room left for lower federal
courts to “mak[e] an independent determination about ‘what the law
is,’” as President Clinton had suggested.67
This is particularly so given Justice O’Connor’s gloss on the “as
determined by the Supreme Court” provision.68 “That statutory
phrase refers to the holdings,” Justice O’Connor wrote, “as opposed
to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant
state-court decision.”69
Although Justice O’Connor was writing for a bare 5-4 majority in
Williams, it appears her formulation is now settled law.70 Concur
ring in Carey v. Musladin,71 Justice Stevens was alone in criticizing
the notion that “clearly established Federal law” is restricted to
Supreme Court holdings, excluding dicta.72 He described this
the Supreme Court renders on direct review”). Section 2254(d)(1) realizes these fears. It not
only codifies but extends Teague, explicitly restricting “clearly established Federal law” to
decisions of the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
65. A. Christopher Bryant, Retroactive Application of “New Rules” and the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (2002) (“Williams stands for the
proposition that AEDPA codified the antiretroactivity principle of Teague.”); Tushnet &
Yackle, supra note 40, at 42 (“Specifically, we think courts will read this crucial new provision
essentially to codify the Teague doctrine as articulated by Justice O'Connor.”). But see Horn
v. Banks, 536 U.S. 266, 271 (2002) (per curiam) (describing the analyses under Teague and
§ 2254(d)(1) as “distinct,” insofar as the Teague retroactivity test must be conducted as a
“threshold” analysis before the AEDPA standard of review is applied).
66. See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 48, at 1580 § 32.3 (stating that “section 2254(d)(1)
establishes a strict choice-of-law rule that is analogous to, but considerably stricter than, the
rule of Teague v. Lane”).
67. Signing Statement, supra note 54, at 631; see supra notes 54-57 and accompanying
text. See generally Liebman & Ryan, supra note 2, at 767-68 (discussing four ways in which
AEDPA “accords more respect to state court finality than did Teague”).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
69. Williams, 529 U.S. at 412 (O’Connor, J., concurring in split majority opinion).
70. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine how faithful the Court has been to
Justice O’Connor’s formulation. In Panetti v. Quarterman, a 5-4 majority of the Court found
“clearly established Federal law” in Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2855-56 (2007). The four dissenting Justices
found this “tenuous.” Id. at 2867 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore, one might
question whether distilling the “gross disproportionality principle” from the Court’s prior
holdings—as the Court did in confronting an Eighth Amendment challenge to California’s
“three-strikes” law in Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)—was a reading of only the
“holdings” as opposed to “dicta” of prior cases.
71. 127 S. Ct. 649 (2006).
72. Id. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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formulation as “Justice O’Connor’s dictum about dicta,”73 and
argued that restricting “clearly established Federal law as deter
mined by the Supreme Court” to the Court’s holdings alone deprived
lower courts of guidance. “Virtually every one of the Court’s opinions
announcing a new application of a constitutional principle contains
some explanatory language that is intended to provide guidance to
lawyers and judges in future cases.”74 Justice Stevens wrote that it
was wrong to encourage state courts to devalue the Supreme Court’s
guidance.75 He concluded, “[t]he text of AEDPA itself provides
sufficient obstacles to obtaining habeas relief without placing a
judicial thumb on the warden’s side of the scales.”76
Certainly, Justice Stevens is right to say that the “as determined
by the Supreme Court” provision, construed to mean “holdings” as
opposed to “dicta,” sets a high bar. For a state court’s opinion to
merit deference under AEDPA, it need not cite—nor even be aware
of—Supreme Court precedents, so long as “neither the reasoning nor
the result of the state-court decision contradicts them.”77 The
presence of a circuit split may reflect a “lack of guidance” by the
Supreme Court,78 and reinforce the conclusion that federal law is
not “clearly established.”79
Carey v. Musladin, a case from the Court’s October 2006 Term,
illustrates the impact of the provision.80 Musladin involved the issue
of whether the presence in the courtroom of spectators wearing
buttons with pictures of a murder victim deprived the defendant of
a fair trial.81 Although Supreme Court precedent established that
courtroom practices might give rise to “inherent prejudice,” the
Court had applied this test only in cases involving state-sponsored
conduct, not in cases involving “private-actor courtroom conduct.”82

73. Id. at 655.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2003) (per curiam); see also Mitchell v. Esparza, 540
U.S. 12, 16 (2003) (per curiam).
78. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654 (majority opinion).
79. Kane v. Garcia Espitia, 546 U.S. 9, 10 (2005) (per curiam).
80. 127 S. Ct. at 654.
81. Id. at 651-52.
82. Id. at 653-54.
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This factual variance spelled doom for Musladin’s chance of
obtaining habeas relief.83 “Given the lack of holdings from this Court
regarding the potentially prejudicial effect of spectators’ courtroom
conduct of the kind involved here,” the Court wrote, “it cannot be
said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established
Federal law” in denying relief.84 The Court’s opinion concluded only
that there was no “clearly established Federal law” about the impact
of spectator conduct in the courtroom, and contributed nothing to
the development of the constitutional doctrine at stake.
The Court’s analysis in Musladin highlights the paradoxical
nature of review of federal constitutional questions under AEDPA.85
In deciding that the state court’s ruling was not “contrary to or an
unreasonable application of clearly established federal law,” the
Court pointed to the fact that the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal were
split on the proper standard for judging spectator conduct.86 The
presence of a circuit split, the Musladin majority reasoned, sup
ported its conclusion that the law in this area was not “clearly
established”:87 if there were governing Supreme Court precedents on
83. Padraic Foran has written about Musladin, arguing that “Musladin serves to
underline the AEDPA’s gnawing premise that in novel fact patterns even the most shocking
injustice will never be federally resolved.” Foran, supra note 4, at 606-07. Foran also makes
the good point that certain constitutional violations that would qualify for retroactive
application of “watershed” rules under the Supreme Court’s decision in Teague v. Lane, 498
U.S. 288 (1989), would not qualify for relief under § 2254(d)(1)—“no matter how unfair the
conviction”—if Supreme Court case law was not “contrary to federal law at the time.” Id. at
612.
84. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654 (quotation omitted).
85. After Musladin, the Court granted cert in several cases, vacated the judgments below,
and remanded for consideration in light of its Musladin decision. See Hudson v. Spisak, 128
S. Ct. 373 (2007) (claimed Eighth Amendment violation resulting from jury instructions
regarding capital sentencing verdicts); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 127 S. Ct. 1247 (2007) (claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel arising from withdrawal of insanity defense on morning
of trial); Patrick v. Smith, 127 S. Ct. 2126 (2007) (claim of insufficiency of the evidence in
shaken-baby case based on expert testimony); Miller v. Rodriguez, 127 S. Ct. 1119 (2007)
(claim of denial of right to public trial stemming from exclusion of defendant’s family members
from courtroom); Schmidt v. Van Patten, 127 S. Ct. 1120 (2007) (claim of denial of right to
counsel by virtue of counsel’s appearance telephonically rather than in person). Two of those
cases have returned to the Supreme Court’s docket. Wright v. Van Patten, 128 S. Ct. 743
(2008); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 128 S. Ct 2996 (2008) (granting certiorari to consider, inter
alia, whether the Ninth Circuit exceed its authority by granting habeas relief “despite the
absence of a Supreme Court decision addressing the point”); see also infra note 92 (discussing
Wright v. Van Patten).
86. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 654.
87. Id. We do not mean to suggest that Musladin conclusively determined that the
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point, there would be no room for disagreement. When occurring
outside of the AEDPA context, the presence of a jurisdictional split
increases the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari and
resolve the question,88 but in § 2254 federal habeas cases, a
jurisdictional split means the Supreme Court will not reach the
merits.
As construed in Musladin, AEDPA’s “as determined by the
Supreme Court” provision clearly sets the final nail in the coffin of
the “dialectical federalism” described by Cover and Aleinikoff. If
lower federal courts are instructed to measure the state-court
judgment at issue against only the holdings of the Supreme Court,
and are not permitted to have a role in amplifying Supreme Court
doctrine, state and federal courts are no longer “required both to
speak and listen as equals,”89 or to attend to one another’s views
with “mutual respect and awareness.”90 The conversation is now
one-sided. Federal courts must defer to state courts’ resolution of
federal constitutional issues in state prisoners’ federal habeas
cases,91 unless the state court determination is clearly out of bounds
under the terms delineated by AEDPA.92
presence of a circuit split necessarily means that the law is not “clearly established” for all
purposes and in all circumstances. Indeed, we do not mean to suggest that there is no room
for further litigation about the exact parameters of AEDPA. Our discussion in this Article is
in many ways premised on a “worst-case scenario” of AEDPA interpretation.
88. Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari:
Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 407
(2004) (“[E]ven allegations of a conflict between lower court decisions, where actual conflict
is absent, increase the likelihood that the Court will grant certiorari.”).
89. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036.
90. Id. at 1048.
91. Professor Yackle has written that the true purpose of § 2254(d) “may be only to remind
inferior federal courts that state courts are their co-equals in a single system, that state
courts do not answer to federal district and circuit courts, and that both state and inferior
federal courts do answer only to the Supreme Court.” YACKLE, supra note 39, at 108. While
it is true that both state and federal courts are sibling courts under AEDPA, they are now
parallel tracks that are not forced to engage in individual prisoners’ cases—not the system
of “redundancy” that Cover and Aleinikoff described. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at
1042.
92. For example, in Wright v. Van Patten, the Supreme Court applied Musladin to reverse
the Seventh Circuit, concluding the state court’s determination that a defendant’s federal
constitutional rights were not violated when his attorney appeared by speaker phone at the
plea hearing was not “‘contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law.’” 128 S. Ct. 743, 746 (2008) (per curiam) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)).
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Stevens wrote, “I emphasize that today’s opinion does
not say that the state courts’ interpretation of Cronic was correct, or that we would have
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A lower court decision in the aftermath of Musladin dramatizes
this lack of reciprocal comity. Emboldened by the Supreme Court’s
pronouncements in Musladin, the Washington Supreme Court dis
missed Ninth Circuit case law as “neither controlling nor persua
sive.”93 “The Washington State Supreme Court has the same duty
and authority as a federal circuit court to apply the United States
Constitution and United States Supreme Court opinions in criminal
matters,” it wrote.94 Thus, AEDPA allows “state appellate courts to
determine and follow their own constitutional precedent” where no
clear rule has been established by Supreme Court holdings,95 and to
dismiss lower federal courts’ decisions as irrelevant.96
B. The Future of Doctrinal Development After AEDPA
AEDPA also freezes the development of doctrine by forbidding
lower courts from relying on and developing Supreme Court
teaching. It is no longer permissible, as Cover and Aleinikoff
described in 1977, for “a significant shift in doctrine [to occur] in the
federal and state courts with no more than dicta from the Supreme
Court to guide it.”97 The lower courts are not permitted to work
forward from the Supreme Court’s general pronouncements of
constitutional principle—at least not in the vehicle of federal
habeas.98
accepted that reading if the case had come to us on direct review rather than by way of 28
U.S.C. § 2254.” 128 S. Ct. at 748 (Stevens, J., concurring).
93. State v. Lord, 165 P.3d 1251, 1257 (Wash. 2007) (emphasis added).
94. Id. (emphasis added).
95. Id.; see also State v. White, 129 P.3d 1107, 1109 n.4 (Haw. 2006) (continuing to rely
on prior Hawaii Supreme Court precedent although federal district court’s grant of habeas
relief had been affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on the grounds that the Hawaii case was
“contrary to, and involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the United States Supreme Court”).
96. Of course, lower federal court opinions in § 2254 cases were never binding precedent
for state courts in subsequent cases. But prior to AEDPA, state courts would have wanted to
study federal opinions to reduce the likelihood that a conviction would be reversed in federal
habeas proceedings. After AEDPA, state courts can now disregard lower federal courts’
interpretation of federal law with impunity. In this way, AEDPA has conclusively ruptured
the dialogue between state and federal courts described by Cover and Aleinikoff. Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1044.
97. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1065.
98. In 2001, Professor Adam Steinman, in an article advocating that federal courts accord
state courts “opinion deference” rather than “result deference” under § 2254(d)(1), identified

2008]

INITIATING A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE

229

Federal judges have recognized this doctrinal stall.99 In an early
articulation of the constitutional arguments against § 2254(d)(1),
Judge Kenneth F. Ripple of the Seventh Circuit expressed the
argument in terms which explicitly emphasized the role of the lower
federal courts in developing constitutional doctrine. “The relation
ship and interreaction of the various levels of the judiciary in
molding constitutional doctrine is the product of a carefully crafted
balance of power between the judiciary and the legislative branch,”
he wrote.100 And while “Congress certainly can influence the
development of the constitutional doctrine,” Judge Ripple allowed,
only the Supreme Court may “determine[] the degree to which the
lower courts ought to be permitted to engage in constitutional
doctrinal development.”101 Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. of the Ninth
Circuit similarly has written that under AEDPA, “[t]he development
of doctrine is despised.”102 Two judges of the First Circuit recently
noted that “[w]ith the congressionally dictated reliance on Supreme
Court precedent, [the] large body of constitutional law developed by
the lower federal courts becomes largely irrelevant.”103
as a “remaining ... thorny” issue the question of whether district courts should address state
prisoners’ constitutional claims before considering whether § 2254(d)(1) permits relief.
Steinman, supra note 3, at 1535-36. Also invoking Cover and Aleinikoff’s concept of “dialogue,”
he urged that district courts first consider the merits of the claim and then whether AEDPA
allows relief. Id. (“[I]f federal habeas courts routinely uphold state court convictions because
they are supported by reasonable state court opinions, without ever addressing the legal
issues independently, then federal habeas courts will have no part in the ‘dialogue’ over
federal rights.”); see also Ides, supra note 3, at 684 (arguing that under § 2254(d)(1)
“[e]xperimentation by the lower courts is, in essence, forbidden”).
99. Of course, not all members of the judiciary are concerned about this phenomenon.
Some see AEDPA’s restrictions as a convenient way to dispose of habeas cases. See Kovarsky,
supra note 3, at 507 (“‘Comity, finality, and federalism’ is now the favored idiom for
erroneously invoking a legislative mood; it has become the means by which courts express an
illegitimate hostility towards exacting standards of criminal procedure.”).
100. Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 886 (7th Cir. 1996) (Ripple, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 887.
102. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring) (“In our
system of law where precedent prevails and is developed, AEDPA denies the judge the use of
circuit precedent, [and] denies the development of Supreme Court and circuit precedent ....
The development of doctrine is despised. That despisal is a direct legislative interference in
the independence of the judiciary.”); see also Lynn Adelman & Jon Deitrich, Saying What the
Law Is: How Certain Legal Doctrines Impede the Development of Constitutional Law and What
Courts Can Do About It, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 87, 90-93 (2007) (describing how AEDPA “thwarts
the development of constitutional law”).
103. Evans v. Thompson, 524 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2008) (Lipez & Torruella, JJ., dissenting
from the denial of rehearing en banc).
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Lockyer v. Andrade104 provides an example of how the develop
ment of doctrine is slowed.105 In Lockyer, the Supreme Court
disposed of an Eighth Amendment challenge to California’s “three
strikes” law. The Court examined the “thicket of [its] Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence” and identified one principle that
emerged as “clearly established”—“[a] gross disproportionality
principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.”106 However,
the Court concluded that its precedent “exhibit[ed] a lack of clarity”
with respect to this “gross disproportionality principle,” such that
the “precise contours” of that principle “are unclear.”107
Before AEDPA, the Supreme Court’s pronouncement of broad
constitutional principles, like the “gross disproportionality principle”
described in Lockyer, could be articulated on a case-by-case basis by
the lower courts—state and federal—engaging in the “dialogue”
described by Cover and Aleinikoff. AEDPA forbids the federal courts
from engaging in that dialogue. As long as the state courts do not
stray far from Supreme Court precedent, AEDPA prevents the
federal courts from interfering. In Lockyer, the Court held that the
state court did not unreasonably apply “clearly established Federal
law.”108 But the Court’s decision—like the decision in Carey v.
Musladin109—contributed nothing to development of the doctrine at
issue, despite the admitted “lack of clarity” present.110 The Court
concluded only by saying, “[t]he gross disproportionality principle
reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary
case.”111
104. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
105. See Bloom, supra note 3, at 535 (arguing that Lockyer v. Andrade “excuses state courts
from the often onerous task of making the right doctrinal choice”).
106. 538 U.S. at 72.
107. Id. at 72-73.
108. Id. at 77.
109. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
110. See Ides, supra note 3, at 747 (criticizing the Andrade Court for “compact[ing] the
unreasonable-application standard into a rule that seems more like an abdication than it does
like a respectful deference for proper state-court judgments”).
111. 538 U.S. at 76. Indeed even if some doctrinal development could be squeezed from the
Court’s discussion of the “gross disproportionality principle” in Lockyer, it would be dicta and
hence unavailable for use by the lower federal courts in habeas cases. See supra notes 68-76
and accompanying text. Perhaps to remedy this, the Court simultaneously issued a decision
in Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003), in which a similar Eighth Amendment challenge
to application of California’s three-strikes law came to the Court on a petition for writ of
certiorari following direct appeal. Because of this procedural posture, Ewing presented an
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The type of doctrine likely to founder on AEDPA’s shoals—and
thus the type of doctrine most in need of development through
petitions for certiorari from state court decisions—is one in which
the Supreme Court’s opinions outline a rule which is very generally
stated, or has significant gaps. Two case studies of doctrinal
development further illustrate this dynamic.
The first example is in the area of ineffective assistance of
counsel, in which the pre- and post-AEDPA stories vary dramati
cally. In 1977, Cover and Aleinikoff described how the Supreme
Court’s dictum in McMann v. Richardson112—that defendants are
due advice “within the range of competence demanded of attorneys
in criminal cases”113—produced a rich variety of lower court opinions
attempting to implement this constitutional principle.114 Cover
and Aleinikoff concluded that this debate among lower courts
“inform[ed] the Supreme Court” by allowing “state and lower federal
courts to evaluate and discuss experiences ....”115 As a result, they
concluded, it would be “far easier ... than it would have been ten
years ago” for the Court to reject the then-prevailing and lessprotective “farce and mockery” standard for judging ineffective
assistance of counsel claims.116 Indeed, seven years after their
article, the dialogical development Cover and Aleinikoff described
came to fruition in the holding of Strickland v. Washington117 —that
habeas relief is warranted if counsel is not reasonably effective.
The post-AEDPA story of ineffective assistance of counsel is not
as dynamic. In a trilogy of post-AEDPA habeas cases in which the
Court has held trial counsel to be ineffective—Williams v. Taylor,118
Wiggins v. Smith,119 and Rompilla v. Beard120—the Court has
disavowed any claim to be breaking new ground.121 In each of these
opportunity for the Court to develop doctrine, unfettered by the strictures of AEDPA.
112. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
113. Id. at 771.
114. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1060-64.
115. Id. at 1065.
116. Id.
117. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
118. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
119. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
120. 545 U.S. 374 (2005).
121. Williams, 529 U.S. at 390 (“[T]he merits of [petitioner’s] claim are squarely governed
by our holding in Strickland v. Washington ....”); Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522 (Williams “made
no new law”); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 393-94 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]oday’s decision
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cases, the Court described the result as dictated by its 1984
Strickland decision. This illustrates the notion articulated by Judge
Noonan that, under the AEDPA regime, “[t]he development of
doctrine is despised.”122 The formal categorization of the doctrine
remains static and rigid. Doctrinal developments, if they occur at
all,123 occur sub rosa—shoehorned into existing doctrinal boxes.
The possibility of sub rosa or surreptitious developments cannot
fully overcome AEDPA’s impediments to doctrinal development.
First, abrupt shifts in doctrine—as have been seen, for example, in
landmark decisions such as Crawford v. Washington124 and Atkins
v. Virginia125—are simply not possible in habeas corpus cases after
AEDPA.126 Second, even gradual migratory shifts in doctrine are
simply applies our longstanding case-by-case approach to determining whether an attorney’s
performance was unconstitutionally deficient under Strickland v. Washington ....”). While
jurists may disagree as to whether this trilogy of cases broke new ground or not, the question
is beyond the scope of our Article. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 542-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The
Court is mistaken to assert that [Williams] ‘made no new law’ ....”); Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 397
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (describing majority opinion as a “distortion of Strickland”).
122. Irons v. Carey, 479 F.3d 658, 667-68 (9th Cir. 2007) (Noonan, J., concurring).
123. See United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (DeCoster I), aff’d
en banc, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (DeCoster III); see also id. at 276 (Bazelon, J.,
dissenting). See generally John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Déjà Vu All Over
Again:” Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel (Cornell Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Paper No. 07-019, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1024307 (discussing the doctrinal development represented by the Williams, Wiggins, and
Rompilla decisions); id. at 27 (concluding these three decisions mark a doctrinal “shift
towards the effective assistance of counsel standard once hailed by Judge Bazelon” of the D.C.
Circuit).
124. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (overruling Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)).
125. 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (declaring execution of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth
Amendment).
126. That the Atkins decision banning execution of the mentally retarded would not have
been possible after AEDPA underscores the differences between § 2254(d)(1) and the Teague
analysis. Not only does AEDPA go beyond Teague by restricting the sources of “clearly
established” law to Supreme Court precedent, see supra note 63 and accompanying text, but
AEDPA also apparently fails to incorporate the Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity. See
Liebman & Ryan, supra note 64, at 867-68. On this reading, the Court’s pre-AEDPA
indication that a constitutional rule prohibiting execution of the mentally retarded (as was
finally realized in Atkins) would fall within the Teague exception for rules declaring “‘certain
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe,’” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329-30 (1989) (quoting Teague, 489
U.S. at 307), is inconsequential after AEDPA.
At least one circuit has held that AEDPA incorporates the Teague exceptions. Bockting v.
Bayer, 399 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2005). Whether this holding—in conflict with decisions from
the Fourth and Seventh Circuits—was erroneous was among the questions presented to the
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impeded. Ordinarily, each constitutional decision proceeds from the
previous decision addressing the issue.127 Under AEDPA—as is seen
in the Williams-Wiggins-Rompilla line of cases—each new decision
proceeds not from the previous decision, but from the bedrock preAEDPA decision in Strickland v. Washington.128 Even if these deci
sions embody sub rosa or surreptitious development,129 it seems
unlikely the doctrine will migrate as far as it might if untethered
from Strickland.130
A second example of AEDPA’s freezing effect involves two
Supreme Court decisions involving claims of improper influence on
the jury—Remmer v. United States131 and Smith v. Phillips.132
Remmer and Smith are in sufficient tension that the general
proposition to be drawn from them remains a matter of lively
debate.133 In Remmer, the Court wrote: “In a criminal case, any
private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly,
with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury
is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial ....”134 In
Smith, the Court addressed a claim of improper influence stemming
from a juror’s pending application for employment as an investiga
tor in the prosecutor’s office, but found that no presumption of bias
was appropriate.135
Supreme Court on certiorari review in Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007). See
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Whorton, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (No. 05-595), at i, 17 (citing Gosier
v. Welborn, 175 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999); Ramdass v. Angelone, 187 F.3d 396, 406-07 (4th
Cir. 1999)). The Court, however, did not reach the issue.
127. See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
129. See Blume & Neumann, supra note 123, at 27-29.
130. If the Strickland v. Washington decision is imagined as an apple tree at the north end
of a large field, Williams v. Taylor was the first post-AEDPA tree to grow in the field. As the
offspring of Strickland, the Williams tree of necessity grew close to the Strickland tree.
Without AEDPA, Williams would have been permitted to bear its own fruit, and the decisions
in Wiggins and Rompilla might have shown a gradual migration toward the south end of the
field. AEDPA effectively requires all new trees to be seeded by Strickland, and prevents the
new trees from bearing fruit of their own. Cf. J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: Using Complexity
Theory To Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for Democracy,
49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1448-56 (1996) (describing the evolutionary “walk” of nuisance law
around its “fitness landscape”).
131. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
132. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
133. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
134. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
135. Smith, 455 U.S. at 215 (holding that “the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is
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Seeking guidance from these decisions, the lower federal courts
have divided as to whether and when to accord a presumption of
bias to a claim of improper influence. While some courts extend the
Remmer presumption generally to all claims of improper jury
influence, others limit the presumption to claims involving thirdparty contact with jurors, and yet others have limited the presump
tion even in such cases.136 Before AEDPA, such confusion in the
lower courts would have contributed to doctrinal development and
increased the likelihood of an eventual grant of certiorari by the
Court. After AEDPA, however, federal habeas courts simply deny
petitioners relief, saying that the law is not clearly established.137
What is most striking about this example, however, is that these
habeas petitioners overwhelmingly failed to pursue certiorari from
state court proceedings when they had the opportunity—even in
capital cases.138 Collectively, this failure means the Court was not
a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias”).
136. See Tunstall v. Hopkins, 306 F.3d 601, 610-11 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Several circuits,
including ours, have extended the Remmer presumption to claims alleging juror exposure to
extraneous information, including claims of mid-trial media exposure .... However, other
circuits have confined the application of Remmer to cases alleging third-party contact with
jurors.” (citations omitted)); Parker v. Head, 244 F.3d 831, 839 n.6 (11th Cir. 2001) (discussing
cases holding “at least in part, that Phillips abandoned Remmer’s presumption of prejudice”).
137. See, e.g., Billings v. Polk, 441 F.3d 238, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that a state
court could reasonably conclude Remmer presumption is limited to cases involving third-party
contact with jurors); Harnden v. Rowland, No. 04-16850, 2006 WL 1477762, at *1 (9th Cir.
May 26, 2006) (mem.) (“[T]he Supreme Court has not clearly extended the Remmer
presumption of prejudice beyond jury tampering cases.”); Sims v. Rowland, 414 F.3d 1148,
1155 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Tracey v. Palmateer, 341 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding
no habeas relief available for jury bias allegations under AEDPA given that Remmer and
Smith provide a “flexible rule”)); Tunstall, 306 F.3d at 611 (“When the federal circuits
disagree on the application of Remmer regarding any presumption of prejudice, it is difficult
to say the Iowa court’s decision is contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.”). The rare decisions
granting habeas relief on a Remmer/Smith issue circumvent AEDPA by relying on circuit
precedent. See Brooks v. Dretke, 444 F.3d 328, 331 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding under Fifth Circuit
case law the question whether a Remmer presumption will apply is governed by whether the
case is among “the genre of cases Justice O’Connor pointed to in her concurring opinion in
Phillips”); Oswald v. Bertrand, 374 F.3d 475, 480 (7th Cir. 2004) (purporting to apply AEDPA
yet using circuit case law to “distill the principle that adequacy” of the trial court’s inquiry
into alleged improper jury influence “is a function of the probability of bias; the greater that
probability, the more searching the inquiry needed to make reasonably sure that an unbiased
jury is impaneled”); id. at 487-88 (Evans, J., dissenting) (lamenting majority’s mere “lip
service to the commands of AEDPA”).
138. See Brooks, 444 F.3d at 328 (capital case wherein petitioner failed to seek certiorari
from state postconviction proceedings where claim was first raised); Tracey, 341 F.3d at 1037
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given the opportunity to develop its constitutional doctrine in this
area. The need for practitioners to adapt their certiorari-seeking
practices to the realities of AEDPA is discussed more fully in
Sections III.B and IV below.
Some federal courts have determined to soldier on in expounding
the Constitution despite AEDPA. The Second Circuit has approved
an analysis in habeas petitions similar to that espoused by the
Supreme Court for addressing qualified immunity questions in civil
rights litigation.139 In habeas cases where doctrinal explication is
appropriate, the Second Circuit will first address whether the state
court erred, and second, whether the error was an unreasonable
application of Supreme Court precedent.140 Thus, although the
(petitioner failed to seek certiorari from state court judgments); Tunstall, 306 F.3d at 601
(petitioner, serving life sentence, failed to seek certiorari from direct appeal and proceeded
directly to federal habeas).
139. Kruelski v. Conn. Super. Ct., 316 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2003). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194 (2001), the Supreme Court instructed lower federal courts to first determine whether a
federal constitutional violation has occurred, and then to determine whether the federal law
was “clearly established” at the time of the incident so as to deprive a state actor of qualified
immunity. Id. at 201. Deciding the questions in this order, explained the Court, allows federal
constitutional law to continue to develop, even if state actors are only liable for violations of
it that were clearly established at the time that they acted. Id. (“This is the process for the
law’s elaboration from case to case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the
existence or nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be
deprived of this explanation were a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the
law clearly established that the officer’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the
case.”); see also Steinman, supra note 3, at 1536-37. The “order of battle” requirement of
Saucier has been criticized as inconsistent with principles of judicial restraint. See generally
Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641-42 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“I would end the failed Saucier experiment now.”). Justice Breyer may
soon have the opportunity to revisit the issue. On March 24, 2008, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in a civil rights damages case, and sua sponte directed the parties to address
specifically whether Saucier should be overruled. Pearson v. Callahan, 128 S. Ct. 1702 (2008).
The case is set for oral argument on October 14, 2008. The petitioner, 2008 WL 2367229, as
well as amici, the Solicitor General, 2008 WL 2436685, thirty-one states and the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 2008 WL 2445507, and the Texas Association of School
Boards, 2008 WL 2367228, argue for a decision overruling or limiting Saucier’s “order of
battle” holding. A brief for the National Association of Counties, Council of State Government,
and other amici, 2008 WL 2445508, argues in support of Saucier’s two-step approach, noting
that “[c]onstitutional principles might never be clarified if every novel claim were met with
the answer that it involved no violation of clearly established right,” id. at *26, and that the
circuit court’s decision to consider the merits of the constitutional question before proceeding
to the qualified immunity issue “reflects a sound regard for the proper development of
constitutional law.” Id. at *32.
140. Kruelski, 316 F.3d at 108.
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circuit court decision is dicta and not binding on state courts, or
even on lower federal courts,141 “state courts faced with federal
questions may want to consult” such decisions.142 The Supreme
Court has not approved that approach.143
For the most part, however, it seems that doctrinal development
will have to originate from some source other than federal habeas
corpus. State prisoners’ certiorari petitions seeking review of direct
appeals and state postconviction decisions will present increas
ingly important opportunities for the Court to develop its criminal
constitutional doctrine. The dissenters in Lawrence v. Florida ac
knowledged this point, writing that, after AEDPA, “[e]ven if rare,
the importance of our review of state habeas proceedings is
evident.”144
In theory, then, the “as determined by the Supreme Court”
provision of AEDPA threatens to impede the development of
constitutional doctrine. Our empirical work, discussed in the next
section, reinforces this conclusion.
141. Id. at 106-07.
142. Id. Compare Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000) (adopting similar
approach), with Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 162 (4th Cir. 2000) (rejecting approach), and
Kruelski, 316 F.3d at 111 (2d Cir. 2003) (Sack, J., concurring) (rejecting approach). Whereas
in the pre-AEDPA world described by Cover and Aleinikoff the redundant structure of habeas
review forced state courts to view federal decisions with “respect and awareness,” Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1048, whether a state court chooses to “consult” federal decisions
in the post-AEDPA world is completely up to the state court. See supra notes 93-96 and
accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text (discussing Carey v. Musladin, 127 S.
Ct. 649 (2007)); see also supra notes 104-11 and accompanying text (discussing Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003)). Writing in 2005, before Musladin, Professors Hertz and
Liebman concluded that Williams determined that § 2254(d)(1) “require[s] careful attention
not only to the ultimate judgment of the state court but also to the validity of the court’s
reasoning process.” HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 48, at 1612 § 32.3. In that same section,
they wrote that “the Court’s overall pattern in applying section 2254(d)(1) thus far”
demonstrates that “situations other than the exceptional one presented in [Lockyer v.
Andrade] ... are usually best resolved by addressing the merits before deciding the section
2254(d)(1) issue.” Id. at 1621-22. Three years later, Padraic Foran, building on Professor
Steinman’s article advocating “opinion deference,” supra note 3, argued that Musladin
represents “an enshrinement of the result-deference framework that Williams had
purportedly rejected for all the right reasons.” Foran, supra note 4, at 624.
144. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The majority decision in
Lawrence which prompted this dissent may further discourage cert filings from state
postconviction proceedings, because it concluded that such filings do not toll the one-year
statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition under AEDPA. Id. at 1081 (majority
opinion).
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III. WHERE DO THE SUPREME COURT’S CASES COME FROM?
A. The Supreme Court’s Certiorari-Granting Behavior
To better understand the practical impact of AEDPA’s “as
determined by the Supreme Court” provision, we examined the
Court’s certiorari-granting behavior by compiling a list of criminal
cases145 decided146 over the last twelve terms, from October Term
145. No two commentators are likely to agree on what cases are “criminal.” For example,
looking at two reviews of the Court’s docket of criminal cases decided in the October 2006
Term resulting in published opinions, we see differences that typify some of the issues that
arise when attempting to define what is a “criminal case.”
The Annual Review of the Supreme Court’s Term Criminal Cases, prepared for the
American Bar Association (ABA) Criminal Justice Section, identified thirty-one “criminal law
related” cases, of which twenty-five were “fully criminal.” RORY LITTLE & SHARIF JACOB,
ANNUAL REVIEW OF THE SUPREME COURT’S CRIMINAL CASES 2 (2007). These numbers included
civil rights cases, prison cases, the challenge to the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003,
immigration, securities, and others arising under federal statutes with implications for
criminal cases. Id. at 4-33. The analysis on SCOTUSblog prepared by Ben Winograd counted
twenty-two criminal cases. Posting of Ben Winograd to SCOTUSblog, By the Numbers:
Criminal Cases in OT06, www.scotusblog.com/wp/by-the-number-criminal-cases-in-OT06/
(July 9, 2007 10:55 EST). Of the 22 cases in the SCOTUSblog list, three—Scott v. Harris, 127
S. Ct. 1769 (2007), Wallace v. Kato, 127 S. Ct. 1091 (2007), and Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910
(2007)—were civil rights cases brought pursuant to § 1983. Two cases—Gonzales v. DuenasAlvarez, 127 S. Ct. 815 (2007) and Lopez v. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. 625 (2007)—were certiorari
grants from immigration proceedings, in which the Court addressed the immigration
consequences of criminal convictions.
Although issues that arise in § 1983 suits and immigration cases can have important
implications for criminal law doctrine, these procedural vehicles are not the subject of our
inquiry. Because our interest here is not only in the development of doctrine, but also in
determining whether the criminal defense bar’s certiorari-seeking behavior is out of step with
the Supreme Court’s certiorari-granting behavior, we defined “criminal case” somewhat
narrowly, to include only those cases in which a criminal judgment was being attacked or
defended. Thus, civil rights cases and immigration cases were excluded.
146. Just as people may reasonably disagree about which cases are “criminal,” determining
when the Supreme Court has “decided” a case is a matter of interpretation. Ultimately, we
opted to include cases in which there was a per curiam opinion or summary reversal, provided
that there was sufficient legal reasoning to constitute an opinion, rather than an order. We
also included cases in which certiorari was dismissed as improvidently granted, or the case
was dismissed as moot, provided that the memorandum decision was substantive enough to
explain the reason for the dismissal.
Thus, by way of example, we included in our analysis three cases that SCOTUSblog did not
(although Professor Little did), in which the Court granted cert but did not issue opinions on
the merits for procedural reasons. These cases were Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007),
in which the Court determined that the petitioner had failed to seek permission to file a
“second or successive” petition and so did not address the merits issue; Roper v. Weaver, 127
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(OT) 1995 through OT 2006. Recognizing it is possible to count the
cases in many different ways, we initially relied on two sources to
gather our historical information.147 We then checked and supple
mented those secondary sources by searching the Supreme Court
reports for the twelve terms.
Below is a chart summarizing the “criminal certiorari grants”
that we analyzed, as broken down by term and by procedural
vehicle.

S. Ct. 2022 (2007), in which the Court determined that cert was improvidently granted; and
Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007), in which the case was dismissed as moot
when the petitioner died.
147. For the period from October Term (OT) 2002 through OT 2006, we used Westlaw’s
“United States Supreme Court Actions” database, which includes a yearly review of cases
decided. E.g., 07-24-2007 U.S. Sup. Ct. Actions 9. In OT 2006, we included one additional case
in which certiorari was granted, and the judgment of the court of appeals was vacated as moot
after the defendant died. Claiborne v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007). We think
inclusion of this case is appropriate, though the Court did not reach the issues presented,
given our emphasis on certiorari-granting behavior of the Court. For the period from OT 1995
through OT 2001, we relied on a very useful and exhaustive series of articles written by
Professor Christopher E. Smith. See Christopher E. Smith & Madhavi McCall, Criminal
Justice and the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2001-2002 Term, 2003 MICH. ST. L. REV. 413 (2003);
Christopher E. Smith & Steven B. Dow, Criminal Justice and the 2000-2001 U.S. Supreme
Court Term, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 189 (2002); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice
and the 1999-2000 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 77 N.D. L. REV. 1 (2001); Christopher E. Smith,
Criminal Justice and the 1998-99 United States Supreme Court Term, 9 WIDENER J. PUB. L.
23 (1999); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1997-98 U.S. Supreme Court Term,
23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 443 (1999); Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice and the 1996-97 U.S.
Supreme Court Term, 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 29 (1997), Christopher E. Smith, Criminal Justice
and the 1995-96 U.S. Supreme Court Term, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1996).
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CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF CASES
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The general trends discernible from this chart are more apparent
when one compares the most recent six terms cumulatively to the
terms before that, as shown in the following chart:
CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE OF CASES
DECIDED BY PROCEDURAL VEHICLE
50.0%
45.0%
40.0%

PERCE NTAGE

35.0%
DA-ST
DA-
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DA-ST

23.5%

29.0%
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0.0%

2.8%

2254

27.2%

40.7%

DA-FED

45.6%

24.1%
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3.7%

3.4%
TERM

Viewed cumulatively, it appears the Court has shifted away from
certiorari grants in federal direct appeals and toward certiorari
grants in federal habeas cases and, to a lesser degree, direct appeals
from the state courts. Certiorari grants in federal direct appeals
dropped from being the clearly dominant procedural vehicle,
accounting for nearly half of the Court’s criminal cert grants, to a
third-place position, accounting for only a quarter of the Court’s
criminal docket. (Because the size of the Court’s criminal docket
varies from year to year,148 we compared the percentages of the
criminal docket represented by each procedural vehicle, rather than
the absolute number of certiorari grants.) The ascendant star has
148. During the OT 1995-OT 2006 period we reviewed, the number of criminal cases
decided in a given term ranged from a low of 19 (in both OT 2000 and OT 2001) to a high of
30 (in OT 2003). Cumulatively, the criminal docket was 136 cases decided in the period OT
1995-OT 2000 and 145 cases decided in the period OT 2001-OT 2006.
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been federal habeas cases, expanding from a quarter of the Court’s
criminal docket to slightly over 40 percent. Also noteworthy is an
increase in the percentage of cases granted from the direct appeal
track in state court, modest in comparison to the rise in § 2254
cases, yet still enough to place such cases above federal direct
appeals in the hierarchy. We believe this modest increase149 in the
Court’s acceptance of criminal cases from the state appellate process
is actually the most significant change over the last twelve terms,
and is the true harbinger of the direction the Court’s certiorarigranting practice is headed in the wake of AEDPA.
The Court’s certiorari-granting practice appears to us consistent
with the theory that the Court is increasingly turning to state court
judgments for certiorari grants which will allow the Court to
develop criminal constitutional doctrine. To understand how this
could be true, it is necessary to consider more specifically the
characteristics of each procedural vehicle. First, certiorari grants
from state court judgments will nearly always present the Court
with an opportunity to develop criminal constitutional doctrine,
whether from the direct appellate process150 or the more rare grant
from the state postconviction process.151
149. The increase accounted for eight more certiorari grants from state courts on direct
review for the OT 2001-OT 2006 period than would have been expected, or 1.33 per term.
While this seems a small increase, it is nonetheless an increase in certiorari grants that afford
an opportunity for doctrinal development such as was seen in Crawford v. Washington, 541
U.S. 36 (2004), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), or Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304 (2002). Furthermore, one might expect that the rise in § 2254 certiorari grants—if
attributable to litigation over the meaning of AEDPA (see supra note 88 and accompanying
text)—will be temporary. The decline in § 2254 grants which may be on the horizon will yield
even more opportunities for the Court to increase its caseload with certiorari grants in
criminal cases from state courts.
150. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007) (passenger of vehicle has
standing to bring Fourth Amendment claim for traffic stop); Cunningham v. California, 127
S. Ct. 856 (2007) (California sentencing scheme violated Sixth Amendment jury trial
guarantee); Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266 (2006) (whether hearsay was “testimonial”
for purposes of Confrontation Clause claim); Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006) (Kansas
death penalty statute does not violate Eighth Amendment); Oregon v. Guzek, 126 S. Ct. 1226
(2006) (no constitutional right to present alibi at resentencing that was inconsistent with prior
conviction).
151. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (reconsidering Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989), and holding execution of defendant who was under eighteen at the time
of the crime violates the Eighth Amendment and Due Process); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175,
186-87 (2004) (“We granted certiorari ... to resolve an important question of constitutional
law, i.e., whether counsel’s failure to obtain the defendant’s express consent to a strategy of
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Certiorari grants from federal criminal cases may present the
Court with such opportunities, but need not. Federal criminal
prosecutions certainly implicate constitutional rights, and the Court
may develop criminal constitutional doctrine through review of such
cases as they proceed through the appellate process.152 However, the
Court may also—and often does—review federal cases solely to
address nonconstitutional questions of federal law, such as the
application of federal rules,153 interpretation of federal statutes,154
interpretation or application of the United States Sentencing
Guidelines,155 or application of federal common law.156 Often the
Court has the ability to resolve federal criminal cases on
nonconstitutional grounds, applying the principle of constitutional
avoidance.157 Thus, whether and to what extent the Court uses
certiorari grants in federal criminal cases to develop constitutional
doctrine seems to be in the Court’s control.
Moreover, federal criminal cases may not present the same kinds
of constitutional issues as state criminal cases. Because the vast
conceding guilt in a capital trial automatically renders counsel’s performance deficient, and
whether counsel’s effectiveness should be evaluated under Cronic or Strickland.”) (citing
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984)); Smith v. Texas, 543 U.S. 37 (2004) (finding that jury instructions violated Eighth
Amendment by preventing jury from giving effect to mitigating evidence).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006) (holding that the
denial of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of one’s choosing is complete without showing
of prejudice and is not susceptible to harmless error analysis); Sell v. United States, 539 U.S.
166 (2003) (announcing Due Process limitations to government’s ability to forcibly medicate
criminal defendant to restore competency).
153. See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74 (2004) (delineating
prejudice requirement for violation of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11); Old Chief
v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (interpreting Federal Rules of Evidence Rules 401 and
403).
154. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005) (interpreting “convicted in any
court,” as used in felon-in-possession-of-firearm statute, to exclude convictions from foreign
courts); Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69 (2003) (allowing Chief Judge of the Northern
Mariana Islands to sit by designation on the Ninth Circuit violated the designation statute).
155. See, e.g., Salinas v. United States, 547 U.S. 188 (2006) (holding simple possession is
not “controlled substance offense” within meaning of career offender sentencing guideline);
Neal v. United States, 516 U.S. 284 (1996) (holding that the weight of blotter paper is to be
considered in calculating sentence under sentencing guideline for LSD crime).
156. See, e.g., United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270 (2003) (holding that a
conspiracy does not automatically terminate when the government defeats the conspiracy’s
object).
157. See, e.g., Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 76 n.9 (“We find it unnecessary to discuss the
constitutional questions because the statutory violation is clear.”).
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majority of criminal cases in the U.S. are prosecuted in state
courts,158 certain kinds of important federal constitutional issues
may arise more frequently—or nearly exclusively—in state court
criminal proceedings. For example, the paradigm shift in con
frontation clause jurisprudence in Crawford v. Washington,159 and
its successor case Davis v. Washington,160 was announced in cases
arising out of local criminal proceedings from Washington. The
confrontation issues presented in Crawford and Davis appeared
with greater frequency and in more extreme ways in state prosecu
tions, particularly domestic violence cases.161 Accordingly, these
decisions have huge implications for domestic violence and child
abuse cases in state courts,162 in which certain kinds of out-of-court
statements by complainants and witnesses had been previously
regularly admitted.
Finally, the Court’s opportunity to develop criminal constitutional
doctrine through certiorari grants in federal habeas cases has
diminished over time.163 During the period that represents the first
158. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that, in 2004, 1,079,000 adults were convicted
in state courts, compared with 66,518 adults convicted in federal courts. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/sent.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). Certain kinds of prosecutions, like family
violence, may be even more heavily concentrated in state and local courts. See U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS 2 (June 2005),
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf. The Bureau reported that “more than 207,000”
family violence crimes were “recorded by police in 18 States and the District of Columbia in
2000,” but that only “757 suspects [were] referred to U.S. attorneys for domestic violence
offenses between 2000 and 2002 ....” Id. By contrast, about one-third of the 1500 defendants
charged with felony assault in 11 large counties in a single month—May 2000—were charged
with family violence. Id. Thus, the total number of federal domestic violence prosecutions over
a two-year period probably equaled only a couple of months of state domestic violence
prosecutions in the local courts of a few large U.S. counties.
159. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
160. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
161. See Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
1171, 1180-81 (2002) (“Many of the cases that have used dial-in testimony—statements made
in 911 calls and to responding officers—have involved charges of domestic violence.”).
162. See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Fisher, What Happened—And What Is Happening—to the
Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y 587 (2007); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Crawford’s Triangle:
Domestic Violence and the Right of Confrontation, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1 (2006); Myrna Raeder,
Remember the Ladies and the Children Too: Crawford’s Impact on Domestic Violence and
Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 311 (2005).
163. Some kinds of federal constitutional claims by state prisoners cannot be litigated in
federal habeas. Under Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), exclusionary claims under the
Fourth Amendment generally cannot be raised by state prisoners in federal habeas
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half of our empirical study, from OT 1995 through OT 2000, it
remained possible for cases to arrive at the Court still uncon
strained by the strictures of AEDPA. In OT 1999, for example, the
Court granted certiorari in three cases in which the underlying
habeas petition was filed before AEDPA’s effective date, and the
Court was therefore able to develop constitutional doctrine in each
case.164 This is not to say that the Court often availed itself of this
opportunity—many of the Court’s decisions arising from habeas
review during this period merely administered the habeas-restrict
ing doctrines discussed above which preceded AEDPA.165 Nonethe
less it was theoretically possible to accept cases to which AEDPA
would not apply and to develop doctrine through those cases. In
more recent terms, however, the availability of cases to which
AEDPA does not apply is limited.166
Thus, the increase in certiorari grants in § 2254 cases does not
represent the Court’s attempt to develop constitutional doctrine.
Instead, it appears that the spate of federal habeas grants repre
sents a continued effort to administer habeas-limiting doctrines
such as retroactivity167 and exhaustion,168 as well as procedural
proceedings, and must be litigated on direct appeal or state postconviction.
164. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61 (2000) (holding prosecutor’s comments in summation
—regarding defendant’s opportunity to observe witnesses’ testimony before taking the
stand—did not violate defendant’s constitutional rights); Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259
(2000) (extending Strickland standard to cover claim that appellate counsel was ineffective
for failing to file a merits brief); Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000) (extending
Strickland standard to cover claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to file notice of
appeal).
165. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838 (1999) (exhaustion doctrine); Trest v.
Cain, 522 U.S. 87 (1997) (procedural default); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997)
(Teague retroactivity doctrine); Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996) (Teague retroactivity
doctrine).
166. The Court’s recent decision in Arave v. Hoffman, 128 S. Ct. 749 (2007) (per curiam),
presented a rare case for the Court to develop doctrine through federal habeas review
unconstrained by AEDPA. The Court, however, ultimately dismissed petitioner’s claim for
ineffective assistance of counsel as moot so that petitioner could “proceed with the
resentencing ordered by the District Court.” Id. at 750.
167. See, e.g., Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S. Ct. 1173 (2007) (retroactivity of Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004)); Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406 (2004) (retroactivity of Mills
v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988)); Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (retroactivity
of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002)).
168. See, e.g., Dye v. Hofbauer, 546 U.S. 1 (2005) (holding that petitioner presented claim
to state courts with sufficient particularity to satisfy exhaustion requirement); Baldwin v.
Reese, 541 U.S. 27 (2004) (finding that petitioner did not fairly present ineffective assistance
of appellate counsel claim to state courts).
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litigation concerning the interpretation and operation of AEDPA. In
the decade since AEDPA’s passage, litigants have raised questions
regarding whether AEDPA applies,169 administration of AEDPA’s
statute of limitations,170 certificate of appealability requirements,171
and procedural barriers to second or successive petitions.172
The increase in federal habeas cases accepted by the Court may
also reflect concern with administration of the death penalty. The
majority of federal habeas certiorari grants in the past five terms
have involved capital cases, while capital cases are rarely reviewed
from the direct appeal track.173 The dissent in Kansas v. Marsh
suggests that at least four members of the Court are concerned
about the death penalty in light of the DNA exonerations.174 It is
also possible that large firms and experienced Supreme Court
practitioners are more likely to take on capital cases at the federal
habeas stage as pro bono projects.175
With the characteristics of each procedural vehicle in mind, and
examining the change in the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior
169. See, e.g., Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003) (holding that habeas petition was
not pending on AEDPA’s effective date and AEDPA therefore constrained review).
170. Lawrence v. Florida, 127 S. Ct. 1079 (2007) (holding AEDPA’s statute of limitation
was not tolled while petitioner sought certiorari in Supreme Court from denial of state
postconviction relief); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (2006) (holding that district court may
raise AEDPA’s statute of limitations sua sponte); Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005)
(holding AEDPA’s statute of limitations was not tolled by untimely postconviction motion filed
in state court).
171. See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004) (holding petitioner was entitled to
Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Brady claim); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322
(2003) (holding petitioner was entitled to COA as to claim that prosecutor exercised
peremptory strikes in racially discriminatory manner); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473
(2000).
172. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 127 S. Ct. 793 (2007) (holding that the district court
lacked jurisdiction to review petition where petitioner did not seek order permitting second
or successive petition); Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (discussing what constitutes
“second or successive habeas petition” under AEDPA); Slack, 529 U.S. 473.
173. Rates of capital cases for the procedural vehicles over the past five terms were as
follows: DA-FED, 0 percent (0 capital cases of 26 decided); DA-ST, 15 percent (5/34); 2254, 56
percent (29/52) SPCV, 100 percent (4/4).
174. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2541 (2006) (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
JJ., dissenting). This focus on the death penalty may not be limited to the Court. Professor
King’s study of post-AEDPA habeas petitions in district courts concludes that capital habeas
petitioners win relief at a rate thirty-five times higher than in non-capital cases. KING ET AL.,
supra note 5, at 10.
175. Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court:
Transforming the Court By Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L. J. 1487, 1557 (2008).
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over the past twelve terms, as depicted in the chart above, it seems
likely the Court is turning, and will continue to turn, to state court
cases for doctrinal development. The Court is deciding fewer federal
direct appeals than it did half a dozen years ago.176 The increase in
certiorari grants in federal habeas cases reflects, we believe,
technical litigation about AEDPA rather than doctrinal develop
ment, because procedural questions are emerging as more petitions
are governed by AEDPA. In light of these developments, the
increase in certiorari grants from the state courts—cases where a
federal constitutional question is nearly always decided on the
merits—seems important.
But the Court can only decide the cases presented to it. What
types of cases are being presented to the Supreme Court, and in
what procedural posture do they arise?
B. Practitioners’ Certiorari-Seeking Behavior
To answer this question, we set out to survey all criminal
certiorari petitions filed during OT 2006 (those with 06- docket
numbers).177 We divided petitions into five categories: (1) direct
appeals from federal criminal convictions, (2) federal prisoners’
176. It is important to keep in mind that our analysis in Part III reflects overall trends, and
that there are, of course, year-by-year decreases or increases in certain categories of cases. For
example, among criminal cases with 06- docket numbers (certiorari petitions filed in OT
2006), the Court granted cert in a good number of federal direct criminal appeals—some of
which were argued and decided as this Article was being written. Many of these cases
(although not all) address questions about federal sentencing. See Begay v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 32 (2007), Boulware v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 32 (2007); Claiborne v. United States,
127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007) (vacated as moot); Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 436 (2007); Gall
v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007); Gonzalez v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 32 (2007);
Kimbrough v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (2007); Logan v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1251
(2007); Watson v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1371 (2007); United States v. Williams, 127 S. Ct.
1874 (2007); Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 551 (2007); United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S.
Ct. 33 (2007). This series of cert grants ultimately could affect the procedural composition of
the 2007-2008 docket.
177. We recognize it would be of interest to track certiorari-seeking trends for more than
one term. Only through such an analysis will it become clear whether certiorari-seeking
behavior has evolved over time, in response to AEDPA’s passage. However, as described in
footnote 178, which sets out our methodology, obtaining and coding the data for even a single
term required a significant investment of resources. The Court’s electronic database, from
which we obtained data about IFP petitions, does not even catalogue cases prior to 2004.
Limiting our examination to OT 2006 petitions is also consistent with our focus on current
certiorari-seeking behavior.
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postconviction motions (usually brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255), (3) state prisoners’ direct appeals from state court convic
tions, (4) state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions (brought pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2254), and (5) state court postconviction proceedings.
For the “paid” petitions, we also had a group of appeals under the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which were included as
federal direct appeal cases or federal postconviction cases, depend
ing on their procedural posture.178
178. The first step was to obtain data on the cert petitions filed. BNA/U.S. Law Week
maintains a database of all “paid” petitions and granted IFP petitions, which it categorizes
by subject area. We wrote a computer program to search this database for cases identified as
criminal. For comparison, we wrote a computer program that identified criminal cases from
the Supreme Court’s web-based docket. It flagged cases as potentially criminal based on the
presence of certain words in the caption: for example, the words “United States” or “State,”
or the proper name of a state, were identified as flags, as were terms common to habeas case
captions, such as “Warden” and “Superintendent.” We also excluded in forma pauperis (IFP)
cases from this chart, because only granted IFP cases were included in these sources, and we
developed a separate IFP analysis.
We compared the results of these programs, found very little disagreement, and aggregated
them. An additional five cases that were not identified by the search of the BNA/U.S. Law
Week database were added by our program that flagged potential criminal cases based on key
words in the caption. We also did a “spot check,” comparing our database against selected
orders lists from OT 2006. We excluded pro se filings, because the focus of our investigation
is into the certiorari-seeking behavior of practitioners, not individual litigants. We recognize
that this system would not count filings in which a pro se prisoners’s cert petition was granted
and counsel was later appointed by the Supreme Court, such as Burgess v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 1572 (2008), in which Professor Jeffrey L. Fisher of the Stanford Supreme Court
Litigation Clinic was appointed to represent the criminal defendant. However, we are
primarily interested here in attorney cert-seeking behavior; the Court’s cert-granting behavior
is addressed in Part II.A.
That left us with 347 “paid,” counseled criminal petitions for OT 2006. Although the BNA
database did not include the procedural posture of the case, it did include a cite to the lower
court opinion. Copies of cert petitions in all “paid” and granted cases are available on
Westlaw. Using the published lower court opinions and the cert petitions, we were able to
determine the procedural vehicle for the 347 “paid” counseled cases identified as criminal.
Information was considerably more difficult to obtain for the IFP cases, particularly those
in which certiorari was not granted. BNA/U.S. Law Week and Westlaw do not maintain
information about the petitions in such cases—in part because of the large numbers, but also
because IFP litigants are not required to provide as many copies of their filings to the Court,
so there is no copy for the press. Indeed, for a time, it seemed we would have to travel to the
National Archives or the United States Supreme Court to review the IFP cert petitions on
paper. (We submitted a comment to the Court’s proposed revised rules in the summer of 2007,
suggesting that the Court require parties in all counseled cases (including counseled IFP
cases) to submit electronic versions of their filings, in order to promote transparency at the
Court and facilitate this type of research project. Letter from Professors Giovanna Shay &
Christopher Lasch to the Court Clerk (June 2, 2007) (on file with authors). The Court declined
our suggestion, instead requiring electronic copies of briefs only in granted cases. SUP. CT. R.
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What did this empirical study reveal? For both the “paid” cases
and the counseled IFP cases, federal direct appeal was the leading
procedural vehicle for criminal certiorari petitions.179 Also, in both
categories of cases, state prisoners’ filings from state postconviction
proceedings lagged behind their filings out of federal habeas. The
following chart illustrates our results.

25 (2007); see also Letter from the Court Clerk to Professors Giovanna Shay & Christopher
Lasch (Aug. 1, 2007) (on file with authors)).
To get basic information about these cases, we used our computer program that examines
the electronic Supreme Court docket sheets. The program produced a spreadsheet of all of the
IFP cases, which have docket numbers beginning with 5000; it flagged those cases that might
be criminal based on the presence of certain words in the captions. When we began the coding
process, however, it became obvious that the overwhelming majority of IFP cases were
indigent criminal defendants’ cases, and so we decided to code a representative sampling of
all the IFP cases, eliminating the few noncriminal cases that turned up as we did the coding.
When we ran the program, some 6854 IFP cert petitions filed in OT 2006 were identified
as potential criminal cases, based on our flags. Many of these were pro se. Again, as with the
“paid” cases, we decided to exclude the pro se petitions. For the IFP petitions, we did this both
for the reasons discussed above, but also because the pro se IFP petitions were simply too
numerous (we did the coding without the benefit of research assistants, but recommend them
for future studies). Excluding the pro se cases yielded 3117 counseled IFP cases.
To obtain a random sampling—designed to guard against a concentration of filings of one
type at a certain time of the year—we assigned the IFP cases random integers and sorted
them by the random number assigned. We then coded the first 300 of the IFP cases
(eliminating noncriminal cases), producing a coded group of randomly-selected, counseled IFP
petitions, which we believe provides a random, representative sampling of the IFP petitions.
179. Among the “paid” petitions filed, more than one-third of the cert petitions filed from
federal direct appeals contained a sentencing question, probably reflecting litigation in the
wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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PERCENTAGE OF COUNSELED PETITIONS FILED BY PROCEDURAL POSTURE
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The breakdown among the “paid” cases was 44 percent federal
prisoners’ direct appeals, 25 percent state prisoners’ direct appeals,
18 percent state prisoners’ federal habeas cases, 6 percent state
prisoners’ state postconviction proceedings, and 6 percent federal
postconviction proceedings.180
The domination of federal appeals appears to be even more
complete in the indigent criminal defense community—68 percent
of counseled IFP petitions in criminal cases were filed in federal
criminal direct appeals. This percentage is particularly dramatic
considering there were many more people admitted to state prison
than to federal prison during this period.181 The remaining percent
180. There were 42 government appeals among the 347 paid petitions that we coded. The
U.S. Solicitor General filed two cert petitions in federal direct appeals, Docket, United States
v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1874 (2007) (No. 06-694), Docket, United States v. Rodriquez, 128 S.
Ct. 33 (2007) (No. 06-1646), and one in a § 2255 proceeding, Docket, United States v. Santos,
127 S. Ct. 2098 (2007) (No. 06-1005). All of the Solicitor General’s cert petitions were granted.
Although our principal focus is the defense community, AEDPA’s effect on doctrinal
development has implications for all criminal practitioners.
181. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reported that 56,057 prisoners were admitted to the
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ages for IFP petitions were 13 percent state court direct appeals, 13
percent state prisoners’ federal habeas petitions, 4 percent state
postconviction proceedings, and 2 percent federal postconviction
proceedings.
The weighted totals182 reflect the fact that IFP petitions are much
more common than “paid” petitions—so much so that the pattern of
filing in IFP cases is close to representative of the pattern for all
counseled petitions as a group. Based on our review of all “paid”
petitions and a representative sample of IFP petitions, the weighted
totals indicate that of all counseled petitions filed in criminal cases,
the vast majority are direct appeals in federal cases, while direct
appeals from state court are grossly underrepresented.
Thus, although both a doctrinal analysis of AEDPA’s “as deter
mined by the Supreme Court” provision and an empirical analysis
of the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior suggest the increasing
importance of seeking certiorari—and of the opportunity to seek
certiorari—from state direct appeal and postconviction judgments,
state prisoners simply do not file cert petitions at the same rate as
federal criminal defendants.183 And state prisoners filed far more
petitions from federal habeas proceedings than they did from state
postconviction proceedings—despite the nearly absolute barrier
AEDPA seems to impose on doctrinal development through habeas.
In the next section we consider factors that could contribute to the
cert-filing gap between federal and state proceedings and the
imbalance between practitioners’ certiorari-seeking behavior and
the Court’s certiorari-granting behavior.

federal system in calendar year 2005, compared with 676,952 admitted to state jurisdictions.
WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISON AND
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006, at 3, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ pub/pdf/pjim06.pdf.
182. Because we coded all “paid” petitions, but only a representative sample of IFP
petitions, it would make little sense to simply add these numbers together. Our “weighted
total” column weights the sampled IFP results to account for the 3117 counseled IFP petitions
from which the sample was drawn.
183. That nearly two-thirds of the counseled certiorari petitions filed were on direct appeal
from federal criminal convictions is particularly astonishing given that federal convictions
comprise only a fraction of total criminal convictions. See supra note 158 and accompanying
text.
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IV. REPRESENTATION IN SEEKING CERTIORARI FROM STATE COURT
JUDGMENTS
Our findings have a number of implications for the potential
effects of AEDPA’s “as determined by the Supreme Court” provision.
Federal prisoners’ dominance of the certiorari filings may not seem
at first blush directly related to the AEDPA issues that are the focus
of our research. But this gap may indicate that state court criminal
practitioners are not as focused on Supreme Court practice, which
could help explain why state prisoners file more petitions out of
federal habeas than out of state postconviction.
The logical next question is: what factors contribute to the
relatively low rate of certiorari filing out of state court? The reasons
for the gap may be numerous and varied. Many state convictions
may not be serious enough to warrant pursuing through the cert
stage.184 “Cert-worthy” questions, as currently understood by sophis
ticated Supreme Court practitioners (questions generating jurisdic
tional splits),185 may not arise as often in state criminal cases. State
court criminal practitioners may not be as comfortable or familiar
with federal (let alone Supreme Court) practice, and may not be
admitted to the Supreme Court bar. State public defender statutes
and policies may prohibit defenders from filing cert petitions, or
may not provide funding for doing so.186

184. State prisoners will generally have a longer wait than federal prisoners before arriving
at the Supreme Court. A federal prisoner need only pursue one appeal before the certiorari
stage, but many state prisoners will have one appeal of right and an additional level of
discretionary review to be exhausted before seeking certiorari. This discretionary appeal may
take years to complete. Thus, some state prisoners may be more likely to serve their sentences
entirely before the time for seeking certiorari arrives.
185. See Cordray & Cordray, supra note 88, at 407; H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE:
AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 246 (1990) (“[T]he single most
important generalizable factor in assessing certworthiness is the existence of a conflict or
‘split’ in the circuits.”).
186. Defense counsel operating under the federal Criminal Justice Act, by contrast, may
be required (and paid) to file a cert petition if the client requests it and there are nonfrivolous
issues to be raised. See, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 101(g); Sixth Circuit CJA Form 20 Submission
Instructions at 7, available at http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/internet/forms/documents/
CJA200507.pdf (“Time and expenses in connection with the filing of a petition for writ of
certiorari should be included on the CJA Form 20 submitted to the Court of Appeals.”).
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Indeed, as former state public defenders with some exposure to
Supreme Court litigation practice, we suspect there might be a
cultural disconnect between state criminal practice and certiorari
practice in the Supreme Court. Although state court criminal
practice is by definition a local endeavor, Supreme Court litigation
has become a national enterprise, with sophisticated advocates
searching for federal circuit splits that are readily identifiable to
Supreme Court law clerks as “cert-worthy.”187 By contrast, local
criminal defense attorneys are often under-resourced188 and may not
readily expend resources on cert petitions deemed to be “long-shots.”
The low percentage of cert petitions granted each year probably
further discourages practitioners.189
Other factors may limit the number of cert petitions filed from
state court judgments by the private bar. Litigants who are not
eligible for appointed counsel may not want to expend the resources
for a cert petition that has little chance for success.190 Their local
counsel may advise them it is not worth the effort. By contrast,
federal defendants may feel their chances at a cert grant are better,
or they may simply have the resources to expend to hire a lawyer.
And Supreme Court practitioners may be willing to file a cert
petition pro bono on behalf of a federal defendant with a classically
cert-worthy issue—for example, a question of federal statutory
interpretation on which the circuit courts are split—particularly if
the case, if granted, will garner a Supreme Court argument.

187. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 980 (2007) (book review) (“Ascertaining the presence
of a lower court conflict requires less subjectivity from law clerks than determining, for
example, whether [a case presents an] ‘important question of federal law ....’” (quoting SUP.
CT. R. 10cc))); see also Cordray & Cordray, supra note 88, at 407; PERRY, supra note 185, at
246.
188. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENSE, GIDEON’S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, at iv-vi (2004),
available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/defender/brokenpromise/fullreport.pdf
[hereinafter GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE].
189. Saul Brenner, Granting Certiorari by the United States Supreme Court: An Overview
of the Social Science Studies, LAW LIB. J. 193, 195, available at http://www.aallnet.org/
products/pub_llj_v92n02/2000-17.pdf (finding that in 1995, Court granted 4 percent of “paid”
petitions and 0.3 percent of IFP petitions).
190. Indeed, for litigants who cannot proceed in forma pauperis, even the costs of printing
a certiorari petition may be daunting.
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Another factor undoubtedly contributing to the gap between local
criminal litigation and Supreme Court practice is the increasing
professionalization of the Supreme Court bar. In a recent paper,
Professor Richard Lazarus describes “the emergence of a new elite
Supreme Court Bar,” beginning in about 1985.191 This group of elite
lawyers enjoys great success in convincing the Court to grant cases.
For example, in OT 2005, twenty-four of the sixty-seven [nonSolicitor General] petitions in which certiorari was granted were
filed by counsel who Professor Lazarus defined as “expert.”192 Expert
counsel are skilled at casting a case as “cert-worthy,”193 and enjoy
the respect and confidence of the Supreme Court law clerks who
make recommendations regarding cert.194 Although the new
Supreme Court elite may take on the occasional pro bono criminal
case as a “loss leader” to increase their exposure before the Court,195
their usual clients are large private sector companies.196 Lazarus
writes (albeit without citation) that the criminal defense bar is
reluctant to allow experienced Supreme Court practitioners to assist
with their cases.197 Whether this assertion is true, whether it applies
uniformly to all Supreme Court experts, and whether there is any
legitimate basis for defenders’ reluctance to surrender control of
their clients’ cases are all questions that may be debated.
There may be a kind of emerging “market” for the most cert
worthy criminal cases, in which sophisticated Supreme Court
practitioners shop for jurisdictional splits and take on pro bono
cases,198 and the growing number of law school Supreme Court

191. Lazarus, supra note 175, at 1490, 1497.
192. Id. at 1516-17. Prof. Lazarus defined “expert” to mean that they had personally argued
a case before the Supreme Court at least five times, or that they were affiliated with a firm
whose lawyers had done at least ten Supreme Court arguments. Id. at 1502.
193. Id. at 1528.
194. Id. at 1525.
195. Id. at 1557.
196. Id. at 1531 (“The individuals dominating the Supreme Court bar today as petitioners
are mostly private sector attorneys working with law firms and representing business
interests.”).
197. However, a number of recent cases have been argued by elite Supreme Court
practitioners from “white shoe” firms. E.g., Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007)
(argued by Donald Verrilli, of Jenner & Block); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (2006)
(same); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003) (same); Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004)
(argued by Edward H. Tillinghast, III, of Coudert Brothers, LLP).
198. Lazarus, supra note 175, at 1557-58.
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clinics may contribute to the competition for cert-worthy cases.199
Judgments of state courts may be a relatively untapped source of
potential pro bono cases for this market.200 However, the pro bono
market is small and focuses primarily on a single indicator of cert
worthiness—jurisdictional splits susceptible to computer searching.
Moreover, even expert offers of help sometimes are met with a cold
reception. Criminal practitioners may be reluctant to relinquish
cases that they have developed, suspicious of the motives of “big
firm” counsel who represent mostly private interests, or resentful
that offers of help arrive only when a client’s case is headed to the
Supreme Court.201
Obviously, it is a complicated task to unravel the role of all of
these factors to explain why state prisoners seek cert on direct
appeal less frequently than federal prisoners, and why state
prisoners’ postconviction cert filings lag behind state prisoners’
filings out of federal habeas. We decided to focus on only a single
aspect of the problem—possible structural or common barriers to
appointed counsel seeking certiorari from judgments of state courts.
To that end, we did a small survey of public defenders regarding
cert-seeking practices and the factors that influence these practices.
A. Defender Certiorari Survey
We disseminated a survey through the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association (NLADA) leadership group.202 It asked
whether respondents’ offices represented clients in seeking certio
rari from judgments of state courts in direct appeals and state
postconviction proceedings.203
199. Id. In the spirit of full disclosure, while a Cover Fellow, coauthor Giovanna Shay was
an instructor in the Yale Supreme Court Advocacy Clinic.
200. See, e.g., Golphin v. Florida, 128 S. Ct. 40 (2007) (denying certiorari in Fourth
Amendment case out of Florida Supreme Court, in which Yale clinic filed cert petition);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Golphin v. Florida, 128 S. Ct 40 (2007) (No. 06-1251).
201. Lazarus, supra note 175, at 1560-61.
202. NLADA, Certiorari Survey (2007) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Survey].
203. We also asked questions designed to identify some of the factors governing whether
cert petitions are filed. We do not attach statistical significance to the results. We offer it only
as an initial, exploratory instrument to tease out some future areas of inquiry. We asked the
respondents who said they represented clients in filing cert petitions on direct appeal of
criminal convictions from state court to select (or write in) factors that influenced their
decision whether to file. Id. The leading response was “significance of the issue” (twenty-six
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We received forty-two responses.204 Of these, one state public
defender office—Pennsylvania’s—said it was statutorily barred from
providing representation to clients seeking certiorari from a
judgment of a state court on direct appeal.205
Pennsylvania and seven more state public defender respondents
(Massachusetts,206 Louisiana, Florida, Connecticut,207 New Hamp
shire,208 Virginia, and Delaware209) said they did not usually file cert
petitions from state postconviction matters.210 The reasons given
included that these offices do not represent clients in state
postconviction proceedings (in part because such proceedings often
allege ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on direct appeal,
which would create a conflict of interest for the public defender
respondents). The second most-frequently response was “death penalty case” (twenty
responses). Id. Closely following were “likelihood of success” (nineteen respondents),
“contradicts U.S. Supreme Court precedent” (eighteen), and “attorney interest” (sixteen). Id.
The presence of a jurisdictional split—the leading indicator of whether the Supreme Court
will grant cert—ranked sixth in frequency of selection (fifteen respondents). Id. Fourteen
respondents selected “severity of penalty” (which overlaps with “death penalty”), and thirteen
respondents cited “availability of resources.” Id. Only three said that their decision to file was
affected by their statutory mandate. Id.
204. One respondent was exclusively a federal defender agency that did not represent
clients in state court. Id. We received seven responses from a single federal defender office
that did some state court work to exhaust clients’ claims. Id.
205. 16 PA. STAT. ANN. § 9960.6 (2008) (listing situations in which the “public defender
shall be responsible for furnishing legal counsel”). One California public defender responded
that the courts appointed appellate counsel (and that the issue had not arisen in his tenure),
and two South Carolina offices reported that a separate state defender agency handles cert
petitions. Survey supra note 202.
206. The survey respondent noted that cert petitions from postconviction were “generally
handled by the Committee’s Private Counsel Division,” which confirmed in its response that
it did handle such petitions. See infra note 218.
207. The Connecticut public defender responded that office policy was that the public
defender could file a petition for a writ of certiorari in a meritorious postconviction case, but
that “to this point a case of sufficient import has not come up.” Survey supra note 202. The
respondent also cited resource constraints and small likelihood of success as factors. Id.
208. While the respondent noted that the office was generally precluded from representing
clients in postconviction proceedings, because it had represented most defendants at trial or
on appeal, she noted that “when we can represent [postconviction] clients, we would consider
seeking cert.” Id.
209. The survey respondent noted that the office was “unlikely to represent clients on
postconviction because most claims involve [ineffective assistance of counsel].” Id.
210. The Virginia Indigent Defense Commission responded in a follow-up phone interview
that it does not file cert petitions from state postconviction proceedings because it does not
represent clients in state postconviction. Telephone Interview with David J. Johnson,
Executive Dir., Va. Indigent Def. Comm’n (Dec. 5, 2007).
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agency). A Florida office cited a statutory bar. Two offices also
named resource constraints.
Two responses gave some insight into the relatively small group
of cert filings from state postconviction. One state public defender
from Florida said his office would be more inclined to pursue federal
habeas relief before filing a certiorari petition from state
postconviction. A federal defender who represents clients in capital
cases said her office would return to state court to exhaust state
postconviction remedies but would not file a cert petition at that
stage; she also explained they would return to federal court after
exhausting state claims and would seek cert from the judgment of
the United States courts of appeal.
These remarks provide some insight into the structural forces
that may make filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from state
postconviction seem less worthwhile than seeking cert after federal
habeas (even in the absence of a statutory bar). Defenders may feel
pressure to focus resources on filing a federal habeas petition rather
than on filing a petition for a writ of certiorari from a judgment of
state postconviction. These pressures may be exacerbated by the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Lawrence v. Florida that the
filing of a cert petition from a state postconviction proceeding does
not toll the one-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas
petition under AEDPA.211 The Lawrence Court also recognized that
a prisoner is not required to file a cert petition to “exhaust state
remedies.”212
Thus, assuming a low grant rate and limited resources, there is
little incentive for defenders to file cert petitions at the state
postconviction stage. Of course, one potentially under-appreciated
reason for filing a cert petition at the state postconviction stage is
that—for the reasons we discuss in this paper—the Supreme Court
will be able to review de novo the merits of the federal constitutional
issue.

211. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1081 (2007).
212. Id. at 1083.
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B. Provision of Counsel to State Prisoners Seeking Certiorari
We were particularly interested in structural barriers to the filing
of cert petitions—statutory bars, prohibitive policies, or lack of
resources.213 The Supreme Court has concluded that the federal
Constitution does not require states to provide representation to
indigent defendants at the cert stage.214 One noted criminal law
commentator—citing only the Supreme Court decision that
appointed counsel is not obligated to file a frivolous petition—has
written that “[although] the Supreme Court does not provide
counsel for defendants preparing petitions for certiorari ... state and
federal public defenders generally carry through their representa
tion to include the certiorari petition where warranted.”215 Although
this may be true in the federal system, our research suggests it is
far from universally true for state public defenders. The gap in
appointed counsel may explain the difference in filing rates out of
state and federal court.
In the federal system, the Criminal Justice Act requires the filing
of nonfrivolous cert petitions by appointed counsel.216 Some state
and local jurisdictions—such as the District of Columbia—also
guarantee appointed counsel at the certiorari stage for meritorious

213. In 1963, no less an authority than Professor Bator conceded that one troublesome
argument for robust review of state prisoners’ federal claims in federal habeas was that the
poor quality of state prisoners’ cert petitions—“drafted usually without a lawyer” and often
accompanied by an incomplete record—impeded adequate Supreme Court “supervision of the
state courts’ adjudication” and, if not addressed, “damage[d] the purposes served by the
certiorari jurisdiction itself.” Bator, supra note 34, at 520-21.
214. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617 (1974); see Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 610
(2005).
215. LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, 3 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.2 (3d ed. 2007).
216. See Wilkins v. United States, 441 U.S. 468, 469 (1979) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3006A
(1976)). But see Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 8 (1994) (noting that counsel appointed
under the federal Criminal Justice Act are not required to file frivolous cert petitions).
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petitions.217 Others have promulgated standards for appointed
appellate counsel that contemplate cert-stage representation.218
As demonstrated by our survey,219 however, some jurisdictions
do not provide counsel to file cert petitions220 or do not provide
counsel for seeking cert from judgments of state postconviction
proceedings.221 Indeed, some jurisdictions do not even recognize a
statutory entitlement to counsel for the filing of petitions for
discretionary review at the highest state court,222 thereby creating
217. See Williams v. United States, 783 A.2d 598, 603 (D.C. 2001) (citing Qualls v. United
States, 718 A.2d 1039, 1040 (D.C. 1998)); Corley v. United States, 416 A.2d 713, 714 (D.C.
1980) (interpreting D.C. Code § 11-2601 et seq.). The State of Nevada recently joined this
group when the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order detailing the responsibilities of
counsel for indigent defendants, including the filing of petitions for certiorari in all capital
cases and in criminal appeals when “warranted.” See In the Matter of the Review of Issues
Concerning Representation of Indigent Defendants in Criminal and Juvenile Delinquency
Cases, ADKT 411 Exhibit A, at 18, 23 (2008) (Standard 19(d) for capital counsel and Standard
8(c) for appellate counsel), available at http://www.nvsupremecourt.us/documents/orders/
ADKT411Order.pdf.
218. See Massachusetts Committee for Public Counsel Services, Performance Standards
Governing the Representation of Clients on Criminal Appeals and Post-Conviction Matters,
¶ 20 (“In the event that the client’s appeal is unsuccessful, the appellate defender shall have
the discretion, upon the request of the client and subject to the approval of the Chief Counsel
or the Chief Counsel’s designee, to seek relief from the client’s conviction by petition for writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court ... when in the best judgment of the appellate
defender there exists a reasonable possibility that such relief may be obtained.”); New Mexico
Public Defender Department, Performance Guidelines for Appellate Criminal Defense
Representation, Guideline 2.1(g) (2000), available in 4 COMPENDIUM OF STANDARDS FOR
INDIGENT DEFENSE SYSTEMS (2000) (“The Appellate Defender, with the approval of the Chief
Public Defender, shall have the discretion to seek review of any state court conviction in the
United States Supreme Court by writ of certiorari.”).
219. See, e.g., PA. CONS. STAT. 16 § 9960.6 (2007) (providing for the appointment of counsel
in Pennsylvania Supreme Court appeals and “postconviction hearings, including proceedings
at the trial and appellate levels,” and “[i]n any other situations were representation is
constitutionally required,” but not for representation in discretionary appeals).
220. See Strozier v. Hopper, 216 S.E.2d 847, 850 (Ga. 1975) (“[C]ounsel appointed by the
State to represent an indigent has discharged his and the State’s duty when the right of
review by means of appeal within the State system has been completed.”); State v. Harrison,
18 P.3d 890, 894 (Haw. 2001) (declining to authorize attorneys’ fees and costs for appointed
counsel for preparation of a cert petition to the U.S. Supreme Court).
221. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.85.100(c)(2) (2007) (“[A]n indigent person is not entitled
to representation ... for purposes of bringing ... a petition for review or certiorari from an
appellate court ruling on an application for post-conviction relief ....).”
222. See, e.g., id.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-203 (2007) (“Appointed counsel is required to
represent the defendant only through the initial appellate review and is not required to
pursue the matter through a second tier discretionary appeal by applying to the supreme
court for a writ of certiorari.”); State v. Mata, 730 N.W.2d 396, 398 (Neb. 2007) (concluding
that it was not ineffective assistance of counsel to fail to timely file a petition for review with
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the situation that federal law claims may be procedurally defaulted
in federal habeas.223
Jurisdictions may be more generous in providing counsel to
capital litigants at the certiorari stage.224 The vast majority of
jurisdictions in which the death penalty is imposed provide postconviction counsel for capital defendants,225 presumably increasing
the odds that a cert petition will be filed at the postconviction stages
in capital cases (assuming that counsel are also compensated for
doing cert petitions).226 However, a few jurisdictions—most notably
the Nebraska Supreme Court); Harris v. State, 704 So.2d 1286 (Miss. 1997), abrogated on
other grounds, Jackson v. State, 732 So.2d 187, 190 (Miss. 1999) (concluding that Mississippi
statute does not require appointment of counsel to seek certiorari in noncapital case from
state supreme court); Peterson v. Jones, 894 S.W.2d 370, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (“There
is nothing in the language of either Article 26.05(a)(3) or Article 1.051(d)(2) to indicate the
Legislature intended for the appointment or compensation of counsel to file a petition for
discretionary review.”); BALDWIN’S OHIO PRACTICE: CRIMINAL LAW § 75.10 (2007) (“In 1994 the
Ohio Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to counsel on appeal extends only to the
first appeal of right, and there is no right to counsel on a second appeal to the Supreme
Court.” (citing State v. Buell, 639 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio 1994)). Contra Kargus v. State, 162 P.3d
818, 824 (Kan. 2007) (recognizing the right to representation on discretionary appeal).
223. See, e.g., O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 839-40 (1999) (holding that the failure
to present claims to highest state court in petition for discretionary review resulted in
procedural default of those claims in federal habeas proceedings).
224. See American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of
Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (Feb. 2003), Guideline 1.1, Definitional Note 5
(defining scope of representation to encompass seeking certiorari both from direct appeal
track and from postconviction review tract), 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 919 (2003); see In re
Anderson, 447 P.2d 117, 131 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (“We believe that it will protect the
interests of defendants and promote the cause of justice for this court to appoint counsel to
represent indigent defendants in capital cases in the following proceedings undertaken
between the termination of their state appeals and their execution: ... Proceedings for
appellate or other postconviction review of state court judgments in the United States
Supreme Court ....”); see also CAL. GOV’T CODE § 15421 (West 2008) (authorizing the state
public defender to represent defendants in automatic appeals in death cases in the filing of
a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and to represent
defendants in appeals in noncapital matters as long as it is fulfilling its responsibilities to
capital defendants, or it determines that taking a limited number of noncapital cases is
necessary for staff training); B.E. WITKIN & NORMAN L. EPSTEIN, 1 CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW
§ 31 (3d ed. 2006) (“No change was compelled [by the Douglas rule] in the existing California
practice of selective appointment of counsel to represent defendants on petitions for hearing
in the Supreme Court and on applications for extraordinary writs.”).
225. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State
Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086-87 (2006) (finding that
“thirty-three of the thirty-seven death penalty states” appoint “defense counsel in capital
postconviction proceedings,” although only “fourteen of those thirty-three states recognize a
state statutory or constitutional right to have the appointed counsel be effective”).
226. A federal statute guarantees counsel in § 2254 federal habeas proceedings for state
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Alabama—currently fail to provide comprehensive legal counsel to
capital defendants in state postconviction proceedings,227 claiming
this state of affairs is justified by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Murray v. Giarratano.228
The spotty provision of counsel at the certiorari stage mirrors the
uneven provision of counsel for indigent defendants generally.
Professional organizations such as the NLADA have published
standards for appellate counsel relating to the decision whether to
seek discretionary review.229 Nonetheless, in too many jurisdictions
the appointed counsel system has gaps or is poorly funded,230 and
such standards have little chance of being met. In 2004, the ABA
reported that, although “[national] standards recommend that
counsel be provided at every stage of the proceedings, including
sentencing, appeal, certiorari, and postconviction review,” reality
did not meet that aspiration in many American jurisdictions.231
Moreover, it may be difficult to document all of the factors that
discourage the filing of cert petitions from state courts. State
statutes and decisional law regarding the appointment of counsel
death row inmates. 18 U.S.C. § 3599(a)(2) (2006).
227. See Barbour v. Haley, 471 F.3d 1222, 1232 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e too recognize the
logic in the argument that there simply are not enough volunteer lawyers willing to undertake
a full review and investigation of a case in order to initiate postconviction proceedings on
behalf of a death-sentenced inmate. If we lived in a perfect world, which we do not, we would
like to see the inmates obtain the relief they seek in this case. However, we are bound by
United States Supreme Court precedent, as well as our own precedent, which clearly establish
that the United States Constitution does not afford appointed counsel on collateral review.”);
see also Freedman, supra note 225, at 1089-90 (explaining that Alabama “has no system at
all for providing prefiling assistance to capital prisoners wishing to pursue postconviction
actions, known locally as Rule 32 proceedings”) (footnote omitted).
228. 492 U.S. 1, 14 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (providing fifth vote in upholding
Virginia scheme for furnishing postconviction counsel to death row inmates, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that “[t]he requirement of meaningful access can be satisfied in various ways ....”).
But see Freedman, supra note 225, at 1089 (“Giarratano did not decide that there is no right
to counsel in state postconviction proceedings in capital cases. Rather, Giarratano only
rejected the claim of constitutional entitlement in that particular instance, and implicitly held
that other facts would lead to other results.” (citation omitted)).
229. See NATIONAL LEGAL AID & DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS AND EVALUATION
DESIGN FOR APPELLATE DEFENDER OFFICES § I (N) (1980), available at http://www.nlada.org/
Defender/Defender_Standards/Standards_For_Appellate_Defender_Offices.
230. See GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 188, at 8-14. In November 2007, New York
State was sued for alleged constitutional shortcomings in its indigent defense system. See
Anthony Ramirez, Suit by Civil Liberties Group Presses State on Legal Services for the
Indigent, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2007, at B5.
231. GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 188, at 22.
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do not tell the whole story. Office policies and custom, the attitudes
of courts that appoint counsel, and local standards of practice all
contribute to the availability of appointed counsel at the cert stage.
Trial courts may deny funds for appointed counsel to file cert peti
tions, even if attorneys are entitled to compensation.232 Logistical
problems with the appointment of counsel—such as delays—may
impede counsel’s ability to provide quality representation.233
Lawyers may succumb to caseload pressure and too readily file the
equivalent of Anders briefs.234 Or appointed counsel may simply
inform unsuccessful appellants—as one New York treatise advises
—that they have ninety days to file a petition for a writ of certiorari
with the Supreme Court235—a de facto, if unstated, evaluation that
the petition is not sufficiently meritorious for the involvement of
counsel.
Indeed, the cultural gap between local criminal practice and
Supreme Court practice may be the greatest barrier to the filing of
cert petitions. When asked about their cert practices, some dedi
cated state public defenders readily admit they are not familiar
with federal practice, let alone Supreme Court practice. Others
acknowledge that—given resource constraints and the perceived low
likelihood of success—cert petitions are simply not a high priority.
In sum, it is far from clear that counsel is consistently available
to file cert petitions on behalf of criminal defendants in state court,
232. See State v. Green, 620 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1993) (overturning trial court’s denial of funds
for appointed counsel to petition for a writ of certiorari, based on the equal protection and
equal access to the courts provisions of the Florida Constitution).
233. See, e.g., State v. Hodges, 671 P.2d 1051, 1059 n.1 (Idaho 1983) (Bistline, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“As the LePage file in the clerk’s office shows,
following his conviction, LePage, without counsel and indigent, endeavored to obtain
appointment of counsel to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. By the time this Court
caused counsel to be appointed, his allotted time had expired. Nevertheless, appointed counsel
did so petition, but the petition was denied without comment leaving unknown whether
untimeliness was the reason.”).
234. Cf. Austin v. United States, 513 U.S. 5, 7 (1994) (noting that attorneys felt bound to
file frivolous claims); Qualls v. United States, 718 A.2d 1039 (D.C. 1998) (adopting Anders-like
provision for D.C.).
235. GARY MULDOON, HANDLING A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK § 23:111 (2007) (“If leave
to appeal is denied, defense counsel should advise the client of the right to seek a writ of
certiorari from the U.S. Supreme Court. The application for a writ must be filed within 90
days of denial of leave to appeal by the Court of Appeals. SUP. CT. R. 13. Only about 100 cases
a year are accepted for argument by the United States Supreme Court. www.supreme
courtus.gov. Four justices must agree in order for a writ of certiorari to be granted.”).
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especially indigent criminal defendants.236 When counsel is avail
able, it is not clear whether defense attorneys are filing cert
petitions in cases in which they are merited. In light of the fact that
the development of federal constitutional law depends even more
heavily on cert petitions from judgments of state courts—as the four
dissenting justices pointed out in Lawrence237—this gap in the
provision of representation could have significant long-term con
sequences for the development of criminal constitutional doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Unless AEDPA is amended, the indigent criminal defense
community and its allies should think hard about how to focus
renewed attention on seeking certiorari from state court judgments.
The Court appears increasingly disposed to grant certiorari in such
cases. And it is in this procedural posture that state prisoners’ cases
will receive the least deferential, non-AEDPA-restricted review by
a federal court. For criminal defendants with claims that may
require an extension—even if modest—of existing Supreme Court
precedent, the likelihood of success on the merits will be better on
a grant of cert from state court than on federal habeas review under
AEDPA. From a systemic perspective, emerging constitutional
issues will be permitted to develop.238 This paper is an initial
attempt to understand current cert-seeking practices so they may
be augmented and targeted most effectively.
We believe our results counsel in favor of rethinking common
defense practice with respect to certiorari filings from state criminal
proceedings. In general, with respect to both direct appeals and
postconviction proceedings, certiorari from state proceedings will be
the only opportunity for non-AEDPA-constrained review by the
236. The lack of appointed counsel at the certiorari stage may reduce the likelihood of pro
bono help, because elite practitioners sometimes get involved after a cert petition is filed, or
even after cert is granted.
237. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1089 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (joining in Ginsburg’s
dissent were Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer).
238. One example of rapid doctrinal development driven largely by certiorari grants from
state-court judgments is the Court’s recent expansion of the jury trial right beginning with
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and continuing with Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S.
584 (2002), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and Cunningham v. California, 127
S. Ct. 856 (2007).
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Supreme Court—or any federal court. This is the moment for
counsel to think systemically and to argue for development of the
law. State court doctrine may be developing in a way that deviates
from the likely trajectory of Supreme Court jurisprudence. Although
state court proceedings often tend to focus on local precedent, this
is the time for counsel to look outside the borders of her jurisdiction,
and to conduct nationwide research to identify jurisdictional splits.
Atkins v. Virginia,239 Crawford v. Washington,240 Blakely v. Washing
ton,241 and Holmes v. South Carolina,242 are all excellent examples
of positive doctrinal development arising from direct state appeals.
There is even more need for a revolution in state postconviction
certiorari practice. State postconviction counsel often focuses on
preparing for federal habeas—exhausting claims,243 creating a
factual record,244 and avoiding procedural default.245 Instead of
viewing certiorari filings as a throwaway—a prelude to or distrac
tion from the upcoming federal habeas—practitioners should
recognize that certiorari from state postconviction proceedings may
be their client’s last opportunity to receive non-AEDPA-constrained
review of federal law issues. Rather than focusing solely on
technical or procedural issues relating to habeas litigation, counsel
should think hard about raising substantive constitutional issues
that push the envelope.246 For example, Roper v. Simmons resulted
in dramatic doctrinal development on certiorari from state
postconviction proceedings.247 And as Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in

239. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
240. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
241. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
242. 547 U.S. 319 (2006).
243. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2000) (requiring exhaustion of available state remedies).
244. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2000) (prohibiting federal district courts from conducting
evidentiary hearings in habeas cases where the petitioner “failed to develop the factual basis
of a claim in State court proceedings”).
245. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
246. As Professor Ty Alper pointed out to us, filing for certiorari from state postconviction
may not always be intuitive, given state courts’ tendency to issue “post-card” denials of state
habeas appeals. However, state courts cannot evade federal review by refusing to give fulsome
consideration to an issue that has been presented to them. See STERN, GRESSMAN & SHAPIRO,
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 150-51 (6th ed. 1986).
247. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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Lawrence248 suggests, four justices are attuned to the heightened
importance of certiorari to judgments from state postconviction.
At a systemic level, at least two types of initiatives could be
pursued to increase the quality and effectiveness of meritorious cert
petitions from judgments of state courts. The first category of efforts
would support the local criminal defense bar. Simply put, resources
must be made available to permit criminal practitioners in state
courts to file more and better cert petitions, so that cert filings
are more representative of the criminal cases litigated nationally.
To that end, local jurisdictions, professional organizations, and
private firms must support criminal practitioners. Forms of mate
rial support could include increasing funding for local criminal
defense programs, instituting office policies regarding certiorari
seeking, and developing training programs on certiorari practice.
The second type of initiative falls on elite practitioners. Experi
enced Supreme Court practitioners, firms with access to Supreme
Court expertise, and law school clinics should increase their pro
bono commitments and should refocus their efforts to place greater
emphasis on identifying “cert-worthy” state court criminal cases.
The path of least resistance appears to be to identify circuit splits in
federal prisoners’ cases or to focus all pro bono efforts on (admittedly
compelling) death penalty cases in the final stages of federal habeas.
For all the reasons we have discussed, however, after AEDPA,
development of federal constitutional criminal doctrine in state
prisoners’ cases will occur only on writ of certiorari from judgments
of state courts.
A related challenge for the Supreme Court bar is to work more
effectively with local criminal practitioners. Offers of help might be
met with a warmer reception if accompanied by sustained pro bono
assistance and efforts to build capacity within the local bar. While
Supreme Court practitioners tend to view themselves as forum
experts who can learn any subject matter, those who demonstrate
a continued commitment to criminal issues may have greater
success in developing relationships within the indigent defense
community.249
248. 127 S. Ct. 1079, 1086 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
249. For example, Donald Verrilli of Jenner & Block has argued three recent major
criminal cases. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007); Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S.
573 (2006); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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Thirty years ago, Cover and Aleinikoff wrote of the benefits of a
“dialogue” between state and federal courts regarding federal
constitutional issues.250 Through escalating limitations on federal
habeas, culminating in AEDPA’s “as determined by the Supreme
Court” provision, that dialogue has been shut down.
We believe a new dialogue can emerge as an engine for doctrinal
development. Like the pre-AEDPA dialogue, the post-AEDPA
dialogue will be “polycentric” in character and will “demonstrate a
remarkable breadth of views and concerns.”251 But the post-AEDPA
dialogue will not be principally between state and lower federal
courts. Federal courts will continue to play a role in doctrinal
development,252 but in the post-AEDPA world it can no longer be
said that state and federal courts must “speak and listen as
equals,”253 with respect to state prisoners’ criminal cases. Whereas
state courts “felt no need to converse with other state courts” in the
pre-AEDPA dialogue,254 the new dialogue—if it is to emerge—will
increasingly feature conversations among state courts.
To invigorate this new dialogue, criminal defense practitioners
and their allies must think carefully about how to build a vital
practice of seeking certiorari from judgments of state courts. We
hope this Article sparks recognition of the existence of a certiorari
filing gap for state prisoners and initiates a discussion of how to
begin closing this gap.

250. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036.
251. Id. at 1065.
252. See supra Part III.A.
253. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 13, at 1036.
254. Id. at 1064-65 (“[T]he state cases ... consistently canvassed and considered leading
federal cases .... It is far less common to see a sister state case cited.”).

